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INTERSECTIONAL COHORTS, DIS/ABILITY, 
AND CLASS ACTIONS 
Ann C. McGinley* & Frank Rudy Cooper** 
ABSTRACT 
This Article occupies the junction of dis/abilities studies and critical 
race theory.  It joins the growing commentary analyzing the 
groundbreaking lawsuit by Compton, California students and 
teachers against the Compton school district brought under federal 
disability law and seeking class certification and injunctive relief in 
the form of teacher training, provision of counselors, and changed 
disciplinary practices.  The federal district court denied the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss but also denied the plaintiffs’ motion 
for a preliminary injunction and class certification, resulting in 
prolonged settlement talks.  The suit is controversial because it seeks 
to address the trauma suffered by Black and Latinx students in poor, 
violence-torn inner-city communities by characterizing the students as 
having disabilities. 
The Article disagrees with legal scholarship thus far, which posits 
that using disability law to help these students both stigmatizes them 
and ignores current disability law’s focus on individual claims.  
Instead, this Article asserts that concerns about stigma are 
outweighed by the potential to assist distressed students.  Doctrinally, 
it contends the concern for individual claims is overstated because 
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one major goal of disability law is to remove social barriers that 
inhibit the flourishing of people with dis/abilities.  By analyzing the 
social construction model of dis/abilities implicit within current law, 
this Article shows that group-based claims like those of the Compton 
students are a valid use of the class certification power. 
This Article’s key contribution to the dis/abilities studies and 
critical race literatures is the creation of a theory of “intersectional 
cohorts.”  Members of intersectional cohorts share similar self-
identities, attributed identities, and identity performances to the 
extent that it is appropriate to think of them as a discrete and 
cohesive group in relation to a particular issue.  This is a way to 
explore the meso-level of discrete and cohesive social groups who 
share multiple identities without devolving into a micro-level theory 
of each individual or essentializing identities through a macro-level 
theory of broad social groups.   
Understanding poor Black and Latinx students in violence-torn 
neighborhoods as an intersectional cohort presumes that they have 
shared experiences and responses to their environment sufficient to 
constitute a class that should be certified in the Compton suit and in 
other similar lawsuits.  This approach is supported by the scientific 
research on Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) and their 
relationship to complex trauma and disability.  We hope this analysis 
will serve as a model for future theoretical and applied analysis of 
intersectional cohorts, especially with respect to dis/abilities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Being a poor Black1 student in a violence-plagued inner-city can be 
stressful.  Take Chiron, the fictional high school student depicted in 
the 2017 Oscar-winning Best Picture, Moonlight.2  Chiron, a poor 
Black youth in a drug-ridden community, is emotionally sensitive as a 
young child.  After becoming a teenager, he is violently bullied in a 
school environment that seems indifferent to his experience.  Chiron 
responds to this violence by becoming “hard” himself, ultimately 
transforming into a drug-dealing adult.  Chiron’s story is an 
illustration of the trauma faced by poor Black male students in 
violence-plagued inner-cities. 
Because of their intersecting identities and social location,3 a 
significant percentage of the larger cohort of Black and Latinx4 
students of all genders in impoverished and violence-plagued inner-
city communities5 suffers complex trauma because of exposure to 
poverty, violence, and racism.  This exposure creates the need for a 
different learning environment: curricula, teacher training, and 
disciplinary methods that recognize the trauma students have faced.  
Disability laws as currently written aim to remove barriers that 
prevent persons with dis/abilities6 from fulfilling their potential.7  This 
 
 1. We capitalize Black and White to emphasize that race is socially constructed. 
See infra Part III. 
 2. See MOONLIGHT (A24 Films 2016). We note concerns about using a 
Hollywood depiction of hardscrabble inner-city life to develop arguments about the 
real thing. The movie is merely an illustration that helps our narrative, not evidence. 
 3. By “social location,” we refer to a place with particular social meaning.  In our 
culture, “urban,” “rural,” and “suburban” are used to imply certain types of 
communities. By “social position” we mean the positionality of a person within the 
matrix of identities. The trauma we are discussing calls for analysis of both social 
location and social position because it is the result of an intersection of the students’ 
identities (poor, Black and Latinx, young) that is exacerbated by their geographic 
location (urbaphobia — non-urbanites fear of the inner-city — reflected in aversion 
to entering the “hood,” over-policing, disinvestment, etc.). Using intersectionality 
theory, we argue the law fails these youth because it does not recognize that their 
intersectional identities affect their trauma in ways that are shared by the group. See 
infra Part IV (creating theory of intersectional cohorts). 
 4. We recognize that other racial minority students, such as South Asians, are, in 
some cases, challenged by violence-plagued, inner-city environments. Students of 
color (and even Whites) in these social locations could likely be considered part of 
the same intersectional cohort, though their appearance in skin tone, dress, and so on 
might exempt them from some negative treatment to such an extent as to remove 
them from the cohort. 
 5. In this Article, we discuss only the cohort of students whose communities fit 
this description. 
 6. We are part of a small group of scholars seeking to introduce the term 
“dis/ability” to the legal scholarship. See Steven L. Nelson, Special Education, 
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Article argues for achieving that purpose by acknowledging that 
Black and Latinx students living in poverty constitute discrete and 
cohesive intersectional cohorts8 deserving of class certification and 
broad remedies under current disability law. 
 
Overrepresentation, and End-Running Education Federalism: Theorizing Towards A 
Federally Protected Right to Education for Black Students, 20 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 
205, 214–15 (2019) (using term); cf. Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in 
Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidisciplinary, and Responsibility in Social 
Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409, 
1424 (1998) (contending antisubordination’s intersectionality/multidimensionality 
approach best suited to address “social injustice against sexual minorities based on 
race/ethnicity, class, dis/ability, sex/gender and other axes of social or legal status”). 
We use the slash when referring to the actual state of being socially constructed as 
dis/abled but omit the slash when referring to current understandings of disability 
under the law. We are influenced to shift our way of referring to dis/ability by a book 
that, like this Article, merges Critical Race Theory and Dis/ability Studies. The text 
that launched the recent movement toward using this term is DISCRIT: DISABILITY 
STUDIES AND CRITICAL RACE THEORY IN EDUCATION (David. J. Connor et al. eds., 
2016) (collecting chapters synthesizing Critical Race Theory and Dis/abilities Studies 
scholarship in the education context). Editors for the DisCrit anthology describe two 
reasons for using this term: 
We utilize the term dis/ability to 1: counter the emphasis on having a whole 
person represented by what he or she cannot do, rather than what he or she 
can, and 2: disrupt notions of the fixity and permanency of the concept of 
disability, seeking rather to analyze the entire context in which a person 
functions. 
Id. at 1. We agree that this shift in language can help deemphasize the implication 
that persons with dis/abilities are lacking. The editors later expand upon their 
reasoning, stating: 
The latter [“disability”] overwhelmingly signals a specific inability to 
perform culturally defined expected tasks (such as learning or walking) that 
come to define the individual as primarily and generally unable to navigate 
society. We believe the slash in the word dis/ability disrupts misleading 
understandings of disability, as it simultaneously conveys the social 
construction of both ability and disability. 
Id. at 6–7. As do those editors, we retain the word “disability” when “referring to its 
official or traditional use.” Id. at 7. As we discuss infra Part III, the acknowledgment 
that dis/ability is socially constructed is crucial to helping realize the full potential of 
disability statutes. 
 7. See infra notes 146–54 and accompanying text (discussing goals of disability 
law). 
 8. See infra Part IV.A (defining and explicating the term “intersectional 
cohorts”). In the term “intersectional cohort,” we use the word “cohort” as it is 
commonly defined: “A group of people with a shared characteristic.” Cohort, 
LEXICO.COM, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/cohort [https://perma.cc/67AJ-
HQG4] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). When calling an intersectional cohort “discrete,” 
we are referring to the fact that it contains a coherent set of individuals that is 
different from many other social groups. When calling an intersectional cohort 
“cohesive,” we are referring to the fact that it contains a set of individuals that share 
similar identity characteristics, experiences, and responses to societal treatment. Put 
another way, by “discrete,” we mean distinct from other potential groups — for 
example, Black women domestic servants during Jim Crow could be analyzed 
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A lawsuit brought by students from Compton, California, P.P. v. 
Compton Unified School District (the Compton case),9 shows how a 
claim based significantly upon racial discrimination might be 
recharacterized as a disability claim under current law.10  Compton, 
famously the home of the “gangsta” rap group N.W.A.,11 is now a 
mostly working-class and poor town with high crime rates12 and a 
population that is about 57% Latinx, 40% Black, 1% Asian, and 1% 
White.13  The Compton plaintiffs assert they have suffered numerous 
Adverse Childhood Events (ACEs),14 leading to complex trauma15 
 
separately from Black men of that period — and by “cohesive” we mean that they 
have a shared identity to some extent in the similarity of how they see themselves, are 
seen, and/or respond to their environment. We leave elaboration of the relation of 
“intersectional cohorts” to specific social science understandings of “cohort” for a 
future publication. 
 9. P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 
2015) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction); P.P. v. Compton 
Unified Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 5752770, at *1 (Sept. 29, 2015) (denying without 
prejudice plaintiffs’ motion for class certification). A case similar to the Compton 
case was filed by Native American students with disabilities against the Bureau of 
Indian Education. See Stephen C. by Frank C. v. Bureau of Indian Educ., 2018 WL 
1871457 at *8 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2018) (refusing to dismiss allegations that the 
department’s refusal to create systems that deal with students’ exposure to adversity 
and complex trauma so as to facilitate meaningful access to educational 
opportunities); Christie Renick, Bureau of Indian Education Failed to Educate Tribal 
Youth, Lawsuit Alleges, CHRONICLE SOC. CHANGE (Jan. 12, 2017), 
https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/featured/suit-alleges-feds-failed-in-education-of-
tribal-youth/23939 [https://perma.cc/GPU6-QK3N]. As that case deals with a 
different intersectional cohort, we leave discussion of Stephen C. for another time. 
 10. On the Compton case, see generally infra Part I. 
 11. N.W.A., STRAIGHT OUTTA COMPTON (Ruthless Records 1988). 
 12. The designation of communities as “high crime,” and therefore susceptible to 
a higher rate of police stop and frisk, is problematic. See Frank Rudy Cooper, A 
Genealogy of Programmatic Stop and Frisk: The Discourse to Practice Circuit, 73 
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 31, 56 (2018) (criticizing “high crime area” doctrine). Even the 
notion that “crime” is defined in particular ways that generally exclude white-collar 
(and White-perpetrated) harms is problematic. 
 13. See NANCY E. DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY: A NEW DEAL FOR CHILDREN 
OF COLOR 97 (2018) (utilizing 2016 data). 
 14. ACEs are Adverse Childhood Events. They include “things like physical and 
emotional abuse, neglect, caregiver mental illness, and household violence.” ACEs 
and Toxic Stress: Frequently Asked Questions, CTR. ON DEVELOPING CHILD, HARV. 
UNIV., https://developingchild.harvard.edu/resources/aces-and-toxic-stress-
frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/Y5MS-EM4A] (last visited Jan. 13, 
2020). Suffering more ACEs correlates with suffering more “things like heart disease 
and diabetes, poor academic achievement, and substance abuse later in life.” Id. 
 15. Complex trauma includes: 
[S]tressors that are: (1) repetitive, prolonged, or cumulative (2) most often 
interpersonal, involving direct harm, exploitation, and maltreatment 
including neglect, abandonment, or antipathy by primary caregivers or other 
ostensibly responsible adults, and (3) often occur at developmentally 
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and educational disability under current law.16  According to 
developmental research, ACEs include “specific traumas identified as 
having particularly negative long-term effects,”17 including abuse, 
neglect, and household dysfunction.  The plaintiffs allege that their 
schools failed to fulfill their duties under the federal disability laws.  
They seek teacher training for working with trauma victims, 
counselors educated in helping student victims, curricular reform, and 
changes from traditional discipline to restorative justice techniques.18 
The Compton plaintiffs moved the court to certify a class action 
against the Compton Unified School District (CUSD) and grant them 
a temporary injunction requiring the requested district-wide changes.  
CUSD responded that applicable disability laws should lead only to 
individualized determinations of disability and narrow remedies 
limited to those individuals.19  Although the court determined that 
 
vulnerable times in the victim’s life, especially in early childhood 
or adolescence, but can also occur later in life and in conditions of 
vulnerability associated with disability, disempowerment, dependency, age, 
infirmity, and others. 
Lisa Firestone, Recognizing Complex Trauma, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 31, 2012), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/compassion-matters/201207/recognizing-
complex-trauma [https://perma.cc/4TZJ-VLGQ] (citing Christine Courtois, 
Understanding Complex Trauma, Complex Reactions, and Treatment Approaches, 
GIFT FROM WITHIN, https://www.giftfromwithin.org/pdf/Understanding-CPTSD.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GAD2-E42K] (last visited Jan. 27, 2020)). 
 16. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 13, 14–21, 23–27, 28–31, 35–37, P.P. 
v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp.3d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 15-3726) 
(claiming ACEs lead to complex trauma and schools’ failure to accommodate); 
DOWD, supra note 13, at 97–114 (considering ACEs research and the Compton case). 
 17. See DOWD, supra, note 13, at 100–01. 
 18. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 6–8 (alleging that 
there is a national scientific consensus on how to educate children with complex 
trauma, which includes training teachers about complex trauma, engaging in whole-
school remedies, and using restorative justice techniques rather than traditional 
discipline; and that the CUSD had failed to adopt any of these practices despite 
awareness of the trauma suffered by its students). 
 19. It is true that in general, current disability laws focus on individual rights and 
remedies. But the concern that persons with dis/abilities be treated as individuals 
exists to protect persons with dis/abilities and does not preclude class actions and 
group remedies. When a plaintiff brings an individual action under the current 
disability laws, he or she must prove membership in the protected class (for example, 
that the plaintiff is a person with a disability). This is done by an individualized 
determination. See, e.g., Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the plaintiff was not an individual with a disability under the original statute and that 
the ADAAA, the amendments to the original ADA, should not be applied 
retroactively). The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1400–85 (2004), another example, requires that schools create individual education 
plans (IEPs) for children with disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414. IEPs are plans 
created by a team of faculty members and parents that establish the academic 
progress and goals for the individual student and the means for achieving those 
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the plaintiffs satisfied the “commonality” requirement of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), it denied the class certification motion 
without prejudice because, it concluded, the plaintiffs had not 
demonstrated “numerosity,” as they had not proved that the roughly 
25% of the student population that was exposed to complex trauma 
 
educational goals. For an excellent explanation of the IEP process, see generally 
KYRIE E. DRAGOO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41833, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA), PART B: KEY STATUTORY AND 
REGULATORY PROVISIONS (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41833.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KTM3-MGTQ]. In addition to the individual processes and 
remedies provided by the current disability laws, however, the federal disability laws 
also permit class actions so long as the named plaintiffs fulfill the class action 
requirements. See, e.g., Lacy v. Cook Cty. Ill., 897 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding 
that lower court had properly certified a class action in Title II ADA case). 
Moreover, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (as well as the ADA) permits class 
actions alleging discriminatory effect — disparate impact causes of actions — that do 
not require a showing of intentional discrimination. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 
U.S. 287 (1985) (holding that even though not all disparate effects are prohibited by 
the statute, many are). Finally, class actions alleging that the defendant has engaged 
in a discriminatory pattern or practice against persons with disabilities are viable. 
When bringing those class actions in the initial litigation stages, the plaintiffs do not 
have to prove that each individual in the class is a victim of the challenged policy or 
practice. In fact, in a number of cases, the courts have held that the plaintiffs do not 
need to establish that each member of the class has been harmed by the defendant’s 
policies or practices during the liability phase of the case. See United States v. 
Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Colo. 1996) (ADA case alleging pattern and practice); 
see also Int’l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336–42, 360–62 (1977) 
(holding that the plaintiffs did not have to demonstrate that each member of the class 
had suffered illegal discrimination during the liability phase of a Title VII case; 
instead, the plaintiffs had to prove a pattern and practice of discrimination to prove 
liability, and in the remedial stage it is defendant’s burden to prove that individual 
class members did not suffer illegal discrimination). The ADA regulations require 
the state to modify policies and practices that harm individuals and classes of 
individuals with disabilities. Moreover, the regulations prohibit state institutions from 
applying eligibility criteria that screen out persons with disabilities. For example, the 
regulations for Title II of the ADA state: 
(7)(i) A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, 
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid 
discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can 
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the 
nature of the service, program or activity. 
(8) A public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen 
out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of 
individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service, 
program, or activity, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for 
the provision of the service, program, or activity being offered.  
28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (7)(i), (8) (2016) (emphasis added). These regulations anticipate 
changes to policies, practices, procedures, and eligibility criteria when individuals or 
classes of individuals are harmed by them on the basis of disability. 
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had actually developed disabilities.20  Even though the federal district 
court denied the motion to certify a class, it also denied a motion to 
dismiss the claims, concluding that the allegations stated a claim for 
relief under the substantive law.21 The district court’s denial of the 
preliminary injunction, absent class certification, appears to be largely 
due to the court’s discomfort with creating a class remedy without 
individualized determination of the students’ disabilities.22  This, 
effectively, is a causation argument — whether the trauma from living 
in a poor and violence-torn community caused each of the putative 
class members to suffer a disability (under the law as currently 
interpreted).  The court’s decision presumably resists the conclusion 
that a large percentage of the cohort created by the shared 
experiences of being a Black and Latinx youth in a “high crime,”23 
inner-city24 neighborhood is likely to suffer complex trauma and 
emotional, mental, or physical disabilities.  The court’s decision is 
arguably consistent with the disability law’s focus on individual 
remedies.25  In essence, though, its holding would require not only a 
showing that a large percentage of the school population suffered 
complex trauma but also the very difficult showing of evidence on an 
individual basis that Black and Latinx students’ exposure to complex 
trauma had resulted in definable disabilities.  The Article argues that 
courts, when faced with motions to certify class actions in cases 
similar to Compton, should grant the motion to certify the class if the 
plaintiffs provide evidence of expert testimony that the plaintiffs as a 
 
 20. See P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 5752770, at *5–10; *18–19 
(Sept. 29, 2015) (questioning whether the plaintiffs had yet established numerosity 
and typicality necessary for class certification). For a more expansive explanation of 
the federal rules concerning class action certification, see infra note 195. 
 21. See P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 
2015) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss). 
 22. See Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 5752770, at *5–10; *18–19 
(questioning whether the plaintiffs had yet established numerosity and typicality 
necessary for class certification). 
 23. One could try to use a more neutral term by referring to neighborhoods as 
having high crime rates, but as we suggest supra at note 12, that would not be a 
neutral designation either. We thus call these “high crime” neighborhoods with 
quotation marks to indicate that that is how they are often referred to, not an 
agreement with the characterization. 
 24. Unfortunately, the “inner-city” racial minority neighborhoods we are 
referring to are often impoverished. See, e.g.,  Quick Facts: Compton City, U.S. 
CENSUS, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/comptoncitycalifornia 
[https://perma.cc/KR3M-8ZKY] (last visited Jan. 16, 2020) (stating that 23% of 
Compton residents are poor). Hence, we will imply poverty in future references to 
inner-city communities. 
 25. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 16 (identifying individual focus). 
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group suffered ACEs that lead to complex trauma and learning and 
emotional disabilities.  At the liability phase of the case, evidence that 
the class representatives have suffered ACEs, complex trauma, and 
disabilities combined with expert evidence demonstrating causation is 
sufficient to prove the plaintiffs’ case.  Thus, at the remedial phase of 
the case, courts should grant broad-based class remedies requested by 
the plaintiffs such as modifications of school policies and practices to 
assure adequate education of children even in the absence of each 
putative class member’s showing that they suffered individual harm.  
At this stage of the case, the defendant may respond by proving that 
individual members of the class have not suffered disabilities as a 
result of ACEs and complex trauma, proof that would require the 
court to deny individual remedies as to those individuals. 
This Article considers whether the concept of dis/ability — as it 
intersects with race, class, gender, age, and geography — can and 
should be used to do more to help us understand and promote the 
well-being of kids like Chiron and the plaintiffs in the Compton 
case.  It argues that when there is ample expert evidence that 
exposure to complex trauma causes learning, emotional, and physical 
dis/abilities, the plaintiffs should not have to make individual 
showings of dis/ability of the putative class members.  At least at the 
liability stage, a showing that a significant percentage of the 
population has suffered multiple ACEs and complex trauma should 
satisfy the law’s numerosity requirement because the racism, poverty, 
and violence that children in this environment so often face is 
significantly likely to lead to ACEs, complex trauma, and dis/ability.  
Because the Compton plaintiffs are a discrete and cohesive 
intersectional cohort, they should be presumed to suffer similar fates 
from their ACEs — a cognizable disability under current law — at 
least for the purposes of certifying a class when the individual 
plaintiffs allege they have suffered serious disabilities.26 
Ultimately, this Article reframes the debate about the interactions 
between race and dis/ability in schools by proposing an innovation in 
critical race theory’s intersectionality theory.27  The highly regarded 
 
 26. See infra note 8 (defining “discrete” and “cohesive vis a vis intersectional 
cohorts); infra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (summarizing basis for 
intersectional cohort concept); infra Part IV.A (defining intersectional cohorts). 
 27. On intersectionality, see generally infra Part IV.A. To understand how we 
alter intersectionality theory, one first needs to consider how anti-essentialism relates 
to intersectionality. Key critical race theorists Devon Carbado and Cheryl Harris say 
the following: 
Although [intersectionality’s founder, Kimberlé] Crenshaw does not employ 
the language of essentialism, one can read her intervention as an effort to 
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legal scholar who first analyzed intersectional identities and coined 
the term “intersectionality,” Kimberlé Crenshaw, has described the 
theory’s mission as including the investigation of  “how the 
experiences of women of color are frequently the product of 
intersecting patterns of racism and sexism.”28  Likewise, preeminent 
sociologist of race and gender Patricia Hill Collins defines 
intersectionality as “the critical insight that race, class, gender, 
sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability, and age operate not as unitary, 
mutually exclusive entities, but as reciprocally constructing 
phenomena that in turn shape complex social inequalities.”29  For 
 
de-essentialize white-centered representations of gender; to disrupt the ease 
and naturalness with which white women can stand in for all women; and to 
mark the discursive, political, and doctrinal consequences of the 
representational practice of treating what happens to white women as the 
baseline from which to determine what happens to all women — the erasure 
of Black women’s identities and experiences as women. 
Simultaneously, Crenshaw indicts the way in which antiracist advocacy 
treats what happens to Black men as the baseline for defining racism, 
obscuring Black women’s experience as Black people.”  
Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Intersectionality at 30: Mapping the Margins 
of Anti-Essentialism, Intersectionality, and Dominance Theory, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
2193, 2201 (2019). On the basis of that thinking from Crenshaw, via Carbado and 
Harris, we contend that Crenshaw’s work necessarily assumes some of the anti-
essentialist insights from the Black feminists of the 1970s and 80s. But those insights 
are that essentialism is harmful when one non-representative group stands for the 
whole, not that a subgroup of the whole cannot be used as a basis for analysis of the 
subgroup’s characteristics and experiences are sufficiently similar. Devon Carbado 
points out that neither Crenshaw nor he agrees that Crenshaw’s work is simply 
“expanding upon” anti-essentialism. We agree. 
 28. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1991). 
 29. Patricia Hill Collins, Intersectionality’s Definitional Dilemmas, 41 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 1, 2 (2015). We note that we do not feel the need to choose between Crenshaw’s 
and Collins’s similar, though differently emphasized, approaches to intersectionality. 
We take our basic understanding from Crenshaw, whose work we read first, but 
utilize more of Collins’s work to distinguish among macro-, micro-, and meso-levels 
of analysis. See infra notes 173–85 and accompanying text (distinguishing levels of 
analysis). Likewise, law and anthropology scholar Khiara Bridges defines 
intersectionality as “refer[ring] to ‘the interaction between gender, race, and other 
categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional 
arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms 
of power.’” KHIARA M. BRIDGES, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: A PRIMER 233 (2019) 
(quoting Kathy Davis, Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science 
Perspective on What Makes a Feminist Theory Successful, 9 FEMINIST THEORY 67, 68 
(2008)). For Bridges, it boils down to a way to “think and talk about the experiences 
of multiply subordinated individuals and groups.” Id. at 233. In an article about 
violence against women of color, intersectionality theory’s founder described her 
project as expanding upon an anti-essentialist approach to identity, but once again, 
the anti-essentialism espoused by Crenshaw is the inappropriate essentialism of 
assuming that all women have the same experiences as White women and all Blacks 
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instance, everyone has a race and a gender, but women of color are 
generally subordinated by multiple social inequalities in the form of 
both racism and sexism.30  The intersection of being a woman and of 
color thus impacts that group of people differently than it does men 
of color or women who are White. 
This Article makes two key contributions to the literatures on 
intersectionality theory and dis/abilities studies.31  First, at a 
theoretical level, we coin the term “intersectional cohorts.”  This 
allows us to extend intersectionality theory by demonstrating that, 
implicitly, it has always been concerned with appropriate ways to 
define cohorts of identity groups.  As German sociologists Gabriele 
Winker and Nina Degele have noted, there is a happy medium 
between the harmful essentialist analyses of large groups and 
requiring that every individual be defined with such specificity that no 
patterns can be discerned.32  The desire to avoid over-essentializing is 
a reason to distinguish discrete and coherent intersectional cohorts 
from large macro-level groups.  Appropriate uses of intersectional 
cohorts include people sharing similar experiences, environments, 
self-identities, attributed identities, and identity performances to such 
extent that it is appropriate to think of them as both a discrete and a 
cohesive group in relation to a particular issue.33 
Second, doctrinally, we argue that considering the Compton 
students to be a discrete and cohesive intersectional cohort allows a 
group-based analysis of dis/abilities that helps explain why the 
 
have the same experiences as Black men. See Crenshaw, supra note 28, at 1242 
(“Although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of real people, they 
seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices. And so, when the practices expound 
identity as woman or person of color as an either/or proposition, they relegate the 
identity of women of color to a location that resists telling.”). 
 30. See, e.g., BRIDGES, supra note 29, at 249 (noting “there may be a danger that 
attaches to the claim that privileged individuals have identities that are as 
intersectional as those possessed by subordinated individuals”). 
 31. Cf. Kimani Paul-Emile, Blackness as Disability, 106 GEO. L. J. 293 (2018) 
(arguing disability law frameworks might work better than race law in addressing 
racial discrimination because it does not always require a showing of intent); But cf. 
Claire Raj, Disability Law as an Agent of School Reform, 94 WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript on file with the authors) (contending disability law 
cannot be used for pervasive school reform for racial minority children); DOWD, 
supra note 13, at 97–114 (creating developmental equality theory, applying it to 
Compton litigation). 
 32. See Gabriele Winker & Nina Degele, Intersectionality and Multi-Level 
Analysis: Dealing with Social Inequality, 18 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 51, 53 (2011) 
(calling for analysis of patterns within and across groups). 
 33. See supra note 8 (defining “discrete” and “cohesive” intersectional cohorts); 
see infra notes 167–70 and accompanying text (defining and distinguishing self-
identity, attributed identities, and identity performances). 
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plaintiffs deserve class certification and a broad remedy.34  As 
distinguished Professor Crenshaw, who first articulated 
intersectionality theory, implicitly acknowledged when arguing for 
recognizing Black women’s intersectional employment discrimination 
claims, law sometimes requires generalizing, but not too much, in 
order to recognize harms.35  Recognizing poor, Black or Latinx 
students in violence-torn urban environments as a class in cases like 
Compton is appropriate because of their shared self-identities and 
identity performances in response to their common attributed 
identities, especially given that their claim is backed by the science of 
ACEs. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I uses Moonlight to frame a 
discussion of the allegations in the Compton case and other similar 
lawsuits.  Part II evaluates the scholarly debate as to whether the 
current disability laws can and should be used to redress harms to 
racial minorities that are caused by environmental factors.  Part III 
analyzes the social construction of race and dis/ability in order to 
demonstrate that disability law must address barriers that affect 
groups as well as those affecting individuals.  Part IV defines and 
explains our new “intersectional cohorts” approach.  It contends that 
where a substantial percentage of children in a given school district 
have suffered numerous ACEs, complex trauma, and dis/abilities, 
there is sufficient evidence to certify a class, to hold the school district 
liable, and to require broad-based remedies.  The Article then briefly 
concludes.36 
 
 34. Intersectionality theory is fundamentally about the ways that social power 
exercised by categorization differentially impact different social groups. For instance, 
the social construction of the categories of race, gender, class and so on, leads to 
oppression by means of racism, sexism, and classism, but also to oppression specific 
to social locations created by the intersection of the categories. Thinking, where 
appropriate, of social groups in terms of intersectional cohorts allows new forms of 
cross-group analysis. Here, that means looking at poor Black and Latinx students of 
all genders who are located in impoverished and violence-plagued neighborhoods as 
a cohort that is discrete and cohesive enough to justify class action, even while 
recognizing that some individuals will need different accommodations. 
 35. Crenshaw, supra note 28, at 1244–45. 
 36. Although we argue that the court in Compton erred in denying the class 
certification, the desired result might be accomplished by bringing a suit with many 
named plaintiffs without asking for class certification. Given the large number of 
plaintiffs, it would be appropriate to initiate a broad-based remedy or even further 
screening of school children within the same intersectional cohort as the plaintiffs. 
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I. MOONLIGHT AND THE COMPTON CASE 
This Part uses Moonlight to show the stress that young Black male 
students in violence-prone inner-cities suffer and thereby introduce 
the claims of the Compton plaintiffs.  To illustrate this stress, we refer 
to the scene in Moonlight where Chiron is beaten at the direction of 
the school bully and responds in an explosive manner.  We want to 
pause to laud the film for its portrayal of Chiron, who is hardly a 
caricature of an angry Black man.  He is sensitive even as he grows up 
in a harsh world where his drug-addicted mother hates him because 
he is gay and a drug dealer and his girlfriend are his mentors.  One of 
the key scenes in the movie is Chiron’s response to the beating.37 
The scene opens with Chiron’s head buried in a sink of ice.  He lifts 
his head to look at his blood-smeared face.  At first, he seems to be 
merely observing what he sees in the mirror; then, his countenance 
turns grim.  The next scene shows Chiron from behind striding 
purposefully into the school.  The kids who see him initially seem to 
be responding to something in his face.  He bursts through two doors.  
He hesitates momentarily, and his facial expression suggests he is 
thinking about something.  Then his mien becomes grim again, and he 
bursts through two more doors and into the classroom.  He puts down 
his bag, grabs a chair, and slams it over the bully’s head.  He looks at 
the motionless bully and strikes him with a leg of the chair before 
being dragged away by classmates.  When next we see Chiron, he is a 
muscle-bound drug dealer called “Black” who is years older and 
soaks his face in ice water to begin his mornings. 
If Moonlight is telling us something about what it means to be a 
poor young Black male student suffering from complex trauma, what 
is it?  Chiron points toward the trauma generally experienced by 
Black and Latinx youth of all genders in inner-cities.  Physically, they 
are more likely to suffer a battery or sexual assault.38  They are also 
more likely to suffer vicarious trauma through witnessing violence 
against friends and family.39  Environmentally, they are more likely to 
live in ethnically or racially isolated communities,  raising the 
likelihood of suffering from racial bias in policing, employment, 
 
 37. See Moonlight – Chiron Loses It (‘Becoming Black’), YOUTUBE (June 28, 
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVAbPyJyraQ [https://perma.cc/4LP6-
SY6H] (depicting Chiron’s transition to “Black”). 
 38. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 16 (asserting that Plaintiff 
had suffered and witnessed many incidents of serious violence). 
 39. See id. at ¶¶ 16, 28–30 (asserting that the plaintiffs have suffered and 
witnessed extreme violence). 
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housing, and other traumas.40  Such neighborhoods also are often 
financially impoverished.  Combined, racism and poverty raise the 
risk that children will suffer from problems like food insecurity and 
toxic hazards.41  Kids like Chiron, living in communities segregated by 
race, also feel the psychic pain of living in poverty in a nation of vast 
wealth.42  Then they are shunted into ethnically or racially segregated 
schools that are underfunded, overpoliced, and stereotyped as not 
producing smart and productive civilians.  We thus posit, based on the 
evidence produced in Compton and our analysis below, that this 
particular intersection of race, gender, place, and poverty is 
disproportionately a site that produces complex trauma and 
emotional, mental, and physical disabilities.  To understand why, we 
need to consider how the Compton case has played out against the 
backdrop of federal disability law. 
In May 2015, plaintiffs — students and teachers — filed a class 
action suit against CUSD, the Superintendent, and members of the 
Compton school board, alleging the defendants had violated Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Department of Education 
regulations promulgated under Section 504, and Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.43  The First Amended Complaint 
details the backgrounds of children living in Compton.  They suffer 
from poverty, racism,  incarceration, violence, homophobia, and the 
threat of deportations.44  The complaint further alleges that students 
in poor communities experience complex trauma, which is often 
compounded by minority status and racism.45  Specifically, a number 
of the student-plaintiffs allege that they have suffered from severe 
ACEs, including witnessing the violent death of friends or family 
 
 40. See generally Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: 
Navigating the Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1999, 
2002 (2007) (community economic development implicates environmental justice) 
(citing Rachel D. Godsil & James S. 
Freeman, Jobs, Trees, and Autonomy: The Convergence of the Environmental           
Justice Movement and Community Economic Development, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP.         
LEGAL ISSUES 25, 47 (1994)). 
 41. See, e.g., William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America 
Today: An Introduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 16 (2012) (contending “[s]egregation 
concentrates poverty, and concentrated poverty leads to poor health outcomes 
cradle-to-grave”). 
 42. See, e.g., Robert Doughten, Filling Everyone’s Bowl: A Call to Affirm A 
Positive Right to Minimum Welfare Guarantees and Shelter in State Constitutions to 
Satisfy International Standards of Human Decency, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 421, 422 (2004) 
(decrying wealth inequality). 
 43. First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 6–8. 
 44. Id. at ¶ 12. 
 45. Id. 
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members, seeing a father hold a gun to a mother’s head, sexual 
assault, losing a parent or close family member to disease or violence, 
and separation from siblings when placed in foster care, among other 
trauma-inducing situations.46 
According to the Complaint, research demonstrates that although 
children vary in their reactions, those who suffer two or more ACEs 
are prone to complex trauma, resulting in symptoms that often fit the 
definition of disability under the federal disability statutes — such as 
an impairment that substantially limits brain function, and the ability 
to learn, think, and concentrate, among other major life activities.47  
Professor Dowd’s book details the research that supports the 
Complaint’s allegations.48  For instance, ACEs can cause changes in 
the neurological system, hyper-sensitivities, and complex trauma.49  
Accepted research-based methods exist to improve the conditions 
and education of children who suffer complex trauma.50  These 
methods include schools’ affirmative actions to improve the children’s 
ability to learn and to grant these children meaningful access to 
education through both whole-school approaches and individualized 
educational plans (IEPs).51 
The Complaint further alleges that a failure to adopt these 
measures harms children and denies them meaningful access to 
education and that CUSD has not only failed to adopt whole-school 
measures to ameliorate the children’s trauma but has also used 
disciplinary measures that increased harm to children with complex 
trauma, denying them meaningful access to an education.52  Under 
federal law, all qualified children with disabilities have a right to 
“meaningful access” to educational opportunities and benefits.53  The 
Complaint details very specific allegations about a number of student 
plaintiffs, the ACEs and complex trauma they have experienced, and 
CUSD’s failure to adopt or modify its measures to accommodate the 
students.54  It also alleges that plaintiffs-teachers who witnessed the 
children’s reactions to trauma themselves suffered as a result of 
 
 46. Id. at ¶¶ 14–16, 23, 28–29, 33. 
 47. Id. at ¶¶ 1–3. 
 48. See DOWD, supra note 13, at 100–14. 
 49. Id. at 102–06. 
 50. First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 1–7. 
 51. Id. at ¶¶ 5–7; see supra note 19 (explaining IEPs). 
 52. First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 6–7. 
 53. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (stating that qualified 
persons with disabilities have the right to “meaningful access to the benefit” offered 
by the grantee). 
 54. First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 14–55. 
308 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
CUSD’s failure to train teachers and to take other measures to 
ameliorate the children’s trauma.55  The Complaint sought injunctive 
relief that would require CUSD to engage in teacher training, 
restorative justice techniques, and other measures to assure its 
students have meaningful access to education.56 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss all counts of the 
Complaint, which the federal district court denied in a detailed 
opinion.57  Rejecting the defendants’ arguments, the court concluded 
that the plaintiffs’ complaint set forth a viable cause of action under 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,58 Section 504 of the 
Department of Education Regulations,59 and Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).60  While the court did not 
conclude that any particular plaintiff had suffered complex trauma 
and a resulting disability — an issue of fact that would be decided 
after discovery — the detailed allegations in the complaint were 
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).61 
While the court agreed that the Complaint stated a valid cause of 
action, it did not accept the premise that mere exposure to two or 
more ACEs would automatically cause an individual to suffer 
complex trauma or disability under the statutes involved.  In essence, 
the court would require a showing that each of the individual 
plaintiffs who were exposed to ACEs had suffered from complex 
trauma and consequently fulfill the legal definition of a disability.62 
 
 55. Id. at ¶¶ 45–47. 
 56. The definition of “restorative” techniques that the plaintiffs seek is unclear. 
For an analysis of the different possible meanings of restorative justice, see Lydia 
Nussbaum, Realizing Restorative Justice: Legal Rules and Standards for School 
Discipline Reform, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 583, 622–32 (2018). It is necessary to define 
exactly what “restorative practices” the school district will use and how it will use 
them. Id. at 628. The school district must also be aware of differential discipline of 
minority students despite the presence of restorative techniques. See id. at 633–34. 
 57. See generally P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1130–
33 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (describing procedural posture). 
 58. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). 
 59. 34 C.F.R. § 104.32 (1980). 
 60. P.P. v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp.3d 1126, 1134 (C.D. Cal. 
2015). See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2012). Title II is 
found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–65. 
 61. In December 2015, after the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, the 
plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint, which, for all practical purposes, was 
the same as the original complaint. 
 62. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp.3d at 1134. 
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Following the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, the parties 
have been engaged in settlement negotiations.63  Given the duration 
and what appears to be the seriousness of these negotiations, the 
Compton case can only improve the educational opportunities (and 
therefore, the lives) of poor minority children in the school district so 
long as the parties negotiate to create clear disciplinary and 
educational standards that would benefit the plaintiffs.64  Those may 
include the use of restorative justice techniques, as opposed to 
traditional methods of discipline, as well as professional development 
on the effects of trauma and how to support students who have been 
traumatized.  Restorative justice techniques seek to rebuild 
relationships in the community through means like apologies and 
restitutionary service rather than punishment.65  In the event the 
negotiations break down, the lawsuit will proceed. 
Before discussing the case further, we need to address the scholarly 
debate on whether we can and should use current disability law to 
address issues of racial and class injustice.  The next Part describes the 
arguments that have arisen over whether disability law can be used as 
a vehicle to address racial discrimination and answers the question 
why, with reservations, we think that disability law should provide 
relief to address disability-related issues related to race and class 
discrimination. 
II. THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE 
The plaintiffs’ claims in Compton on behalf of kids like Chiron 
have sparked a lively debate amongst legal scholars over whether 
dis/ability can be analogized with race.66  While she does not 
specifically study the Compton case, Professor Kimani Paul-Emile 
argues that current disability law frameworks might be useful to 
further the interests of African Americans.67  Professor Claire Raj 
strongly disagrees, on doctrinal grounds, as she believes the Compton 
case fails the current interpretation of the individual causation 
 
 63. See, e.g., Jeremy Loudenback, Compton Trauma Lawsuit Near Resolution?, 
LA SCHOOL REP. (June 9, 2016), http://laschoolreport.com/compton-trauma-lawsuit-
near-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/W3MT-WBTB]. 
 64. See Nussbaum, supra note 56, at 622–34, 639–44 (discussing benefits of 
restorative justice techniques for students). 
 65. See generally id. (explaining methods). 
 66. On the scholarly debate, see generally infra Part II.A. 
 67. See generally Paul-Emile, supra note 31 (arguing that disability frameworks, 
rather than race law may better deal with race discrimination because disability law 
requires accommodations to the individual and does not always require a showing of 
intent). 
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requirement in the disability statutes.68  Moreover, Raj is concerned 
about the stigma of suggesting that being a racial minority is a 
disability, as that term is currently understood.69  Finally, Professor 
Nancy Dowd’s important book, Reimagining Equality: A New Deal 
for Children of Color, like Raj’s essay, contends that arguing that 
racial minorities have disabilities might lead to stigma.70  Dowd adds 
that, in any event, remedying complex trauma in schools would occur 
too late to promote developmental equality.71  She thus advocates for 
a comprehensive “New Deal for Children” that would provide all 
children with the social and psychological environment they need to 
reach their potential before they enter school — from parenting 
classes to early education and other social services.72  While we 
believe that Dowd’s solutions are ideal, we question the likelihood of 
Dowd’s proposal and believe current disability law’s potential utility 
in helping the Compton plaintiffs outweighs concerns about stigma. 
A. Current Debate 
There is substantial commentary on whether the Compton 
approach makes sense as a means to attack poor conditions in schools 
and create equality.  Paul-Emile’s award-winning article, Blackness as 
Disability,73 advocates the use of current disability law, or at least 
disability law frameworks, to further rights of persons of color.  
Noting that both race and dis/ability are socially constructed, Paul-
Emile explains that race law is tethered to a rigid anti-discrimination 
framework that ordinarily requires a showing of intentional 
discrimination in order to prevail.74  Such an intent requirement is 
 
 68. Raj, supra note 31, at 5 (noting that, “[b]y definition, systemic reforms that 
change the delivery of education for all children are not tied to an individual 
student’s needs, but rather are driven by the group’s collective needs. While the 
group may, in fact, require and benefit from these curricular changes, the FAPE 
standard — and thus disability rights law — does not compel them”) (footnotes 
omitted). “FAPE” stands for Free and Appropriate Public Education, and is an 
individual right provided by the disability statutes. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.33 (1980). 
 69. See Raj, supra note 31, at 6. 
 70. DOWD, supra note 13, at 106. 
 71. Id. at 106, 112. 
 72. Id. at 126–29 (presenting proposal). 
 73. See generally Paul-Emile, supra note 31. See Simone Somekh, Professor 
Kimani Paul-Emile Wins John Hope Franklin Prize, FORDHAM L. NEWS (June 5, 
2019), https://news.law.fordham.edu/blog/2019/06/05/professor-kimani-paul-emile-
wins-john-hope-franklin-prize/ [https://perma.cc/SW9K-YZBS] (announcing award 
for article). 
 74. See Paul-Emile, supra note 31, at 296. 
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difficult to prove and tends not to promote structural change.75  
Moreover, Paul-Emile argues that Black identity, especially when 
combined with class, creates disadvantages that can be overcome only 
by using affirmative remedies.76  Unfortunately, the remedies 
attached to race law infrequently require an affirmative duty to act, a 
duty that exists in federal disability civil rights laws.77 
Paul-Emile’s theory is innovative and intriguing and seemingly 
would support lawsuits against school districts such as CUSD.  
Importantly, she understands the social construction model of 
dis/ability, which we explicate in the next Part, and argues that 
refusing to use current disability law to counter race discrimination 
and other racial disadvantages because of a feared stigmatizing of 
people of color is a refusal based in stereotype and stigma of persons 
with dis/abilities.78  But Paul-Emile’s argument, while thought-
provoking, does not take adequate account of the reality of how 
courts currently interpret disability discrimination law.  While she 
cites the language of the various disability statutes, she admittedly 
does not investigate the doctrine fully. 79 
Even though the ADA was originally written as a far-reaching 
statute that would change the lives of persons with disabilities, courts 
de-radicalized the statute with rigid and narrow interpretations of 
who met the definition of a person with a disability.  As a result, many 
persons who should have protections under the statute were left out 
in the cold.80  In response, Congress passed the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), which 
explicitly overruled a number of limiting Supreme Court cases and 
broadened definitions of who is protected under the statute.81  
Unfortunately, however, even under the amended Act, a substantial 
minority of courts continue to conclude that individuals who appear 
to have valid claims do not meet the current definition of having a 
disability.82 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 326. 
 78. Id. at 299–300. 
 79. Paul-Emile states that her essay is “more conceptual than doctrinal” and urges 
us to use the current disability laws to think about how to approach race. Id. at 302. 
 80. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Explaining “Not Disabled” Cases Ten Years after 
the ADAAA: A Story of Ignorance, Incompetence, and Possibly Animus, 26 GEO. J. 
POV. L. & POL’Y 383, 384–89 (2019). 
 81. Id. at 384, 389–91. 
 82. See id. at 411–12 (arguing that courts are limiting the Act’s potential). 
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Dis/ability law scholar Claire Raj raises practical doctrinal 
questions in Disability Law as an Agent of School Reform and 
suggests a number of improvements over the Compton case model.83  
In a careful explanation of the law — specifically, the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act, Department of Education regulations under Section 504, and 
Title II of the ADA — Raj details the potential weaknesses of the 
legal arguments in the Compton case.  While we do not have room 
here to fully analyze the doctrine or Raj’s essay, suffice it to say that 
Raj’s concerns are warranted.  Raj explains that Compton may be 
stretching the current disability laws, especially concerning the 
remedies demanded by the plaintiffs.84  Generally, she correctly 
notes, disability laws focus on individual children rather than groups 
of children.85  The underlying goal of the Compton lawsuit, however, 
is to engage in overall school reform, without a focus on individuals.86 
At the doctrinal level, Raj shows that while the “child-find” 
requirement under the IDEA — the “location and notification” 
requirement under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act’s 
Department of Education regulations — requires schools to assure 
they have found children in need of special education, there is some 
ambiguity about the measures schools need to take to identify these 
children.87  A requirement that schools in impoverished 
neighborhoods test all students may or may not be a fair reading of 
the law, even though Raj concedes that testing in this situation might 
be useful.88  The problem is that even if testing of all students is 
required by the law as interpreted, she argues, doing so may impose a 
stigma on poor, minority children and communities by linking racial 
minority status to a perceived deficit.89 
Even assuming there is a duty to test all students in particular 
districts, Raj reminds us that the existence of ACEs does not 
necessarily lead to complex trauma or disability in all students, and 
the remedies requested by the Compton case may go well beyond 
what the statutes currently would require.90  The guarantee of a Free 
and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) that students are granted 
 
 83. Raj, supra note 31, at 50–57. 
 84. Id. at 3–6. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 4–20. 
 87. Id. at 4–5, 17, 30, 31–34. 
 88. Id. at 37. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 32–36. 
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under the Department of Education regulations applies to 
individuals, not groups, and the statutes require individual, not group, 
accommodation.91  Moreover, as Raj notes, even when the plaintiffs 
make an argument that pertains to the group under Section 504 and 
the ADA, they may not prevail.92  The reason they might not prevail 
is that the regulations require schools to make “reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the 
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination based on 
disability unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the 
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the services, 
program, or activity.”93  While plaintiffs might succeed in proving that 
such accommodations are necessary to avoid discrimination, the 
school district will argue that the remedies requested are class-wide, 
require the expenditure of substantial sums, portend reformation of 
the entire education program, and therefore “would fundamentally 
alter the nature of” the schools’ educational programs.94  Such 
arguments are not frivolous and may succeed given the deference 
courts often give to schools.95 
Professor Dowd joins Raj in questioning the use of the ACEs 
model and the federal disability laws to create reform for children of 
color for four reasons.  First, using current disability law to attempt to 
ameliorate childhood harms may reinforce stereotypes already 
attached to Black children like “incapability, lack of intellectual 
capacity, and dangerousness.”96  Relatedly, the ACEs approach “may 
tend toward identifying causes in the individual or the individual’s 
family, rather than in structural harm.”97  Moreover, the lawsuit 
intervenes in children’s lives only after they go to school and focuses 
on improving education rather than preventing the harms due to 
structural and environmental causes that occur in early childhood.98  
 
 91. Id. at 16. 
 92. See id. at 38–40. 
 93. Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286, 293 (2d Cir. 1990); 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(b)(7)(i) (1991). While the plain language of the Section 504 regulations does 
not include this defense, courts have imposed this limitation on the regulation. See 
Raj, supra note 31, at 39. 
 94. Raj, supra note 31, at 39. 
 95. See, e.g., C.D. M.D. v. Natick Pub. Sch. Dist., 924 F.3d 621, 630 (1st Cir. 2019) 
(holding that “courts owe respect and deference to the expert decisions of school 
officials and state administrative boards” in IDEA cases). 
 96. DOWD, supra note 13, at 106. Dowd is also concerned that there will be a 
focus on the child and his or her family without a focus on structural causes of harm. 
See id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 106. 
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This contradicts the fact that “early childhood is one of the most 
critical developmental periods.”99  Finally, the ACEs model was 
created to measure adverse family events of middle-class (and White-
normed) children and does not necessarily effectively measure all 
harms caused by structural and environmental causes.100 
Dowd’s critiques are particularly incisive, but, we think, 
surmountable.  Dowd’s proposed “New Deal for Children” would be 
ideal, but given the current social reality of the center-right tendency 
in U.S. voting, her legislative plan may not come to be for a long 
time.101  A switch from an extreme right-wing president to an extreme 
left-wing president is possible, but unlikely.  Moreover, the far right 
has captured the Supreme Court that would have to uphold Dowd’s 
bold proposal.  It is thus worthwhile to consider whether existing 
disability laws provide promise for children injured by the 
intersection of race, dis/ability, and the environments in which they 
live.  In fact, it might be possible to win a lawsuit pursuant to the 
“child-find” obligation to require a school district to screen children 
early on before they are of school age in order to permit the ever-
important early intervention, teaching of young children before they 
reach school.102 
B. Why Use Dis/ability? 
There is no doubt that Raj and Dowd launch significant critiques of 
using current disability law to improve the lives of children of color, 
but we think it may be worth reconsidering the value in such a move.  
We are reluctant to turn to disability law for two reasons.  First, the 
possibility of stigma is real.  Second, the current interpretation of the 
disability statutory frameworks renders the efficacy of a Compton-
type claim of questionable.  While we partially refute those two 
 
 99. Id. at 100. 
 100. Id. at 106–07. Professor Dowd notes that subsequent models have been 
created and tested to include more environmental factors, but she concludes that the 
model continues to underrepresent the harms caused by racism. Id. at 107–10. 
 101. On the center-right tendency of U.S. voting, see Michael W. 
McConnell, Moderation and Coherence in American Democracy, 99 CAL. L. REV. 
373, 378 (2011) (“Essentially, the United States is a center-right country, with a 
decided lack of extremes.”). One could argue this has become a far-right country with 
a strong left opposition, but with very few moderate or even center-right 
constituencies. The reinterpretation of disability law that we imagine requires a 
political shift wherein the left and moderates align against the right. 
 102. See Mark C. Weber, IDEA Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 45 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 471, 489 (2014) (explaining a case in which the court had certified 
classes of preschool children from ages three to five). 
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arguments in the remainder of this Part, we will later turn to a 
reinterpretation of disability law in Parts III and IV for one primary 
reason — the consensus that existing disability law is meant to 
remove socially constructed barriers means it should be useful for 
plaintiffs like those in the Compton case. 
i. Stigma 
As noted above, scholars voice concerns about using current 
disability law to require school reform in poor, racial minority 
neighborhoods on the grounds that such use would reinforce the 
stigma that minority students already suffer — that they are inferior 
to White students intellectually.103  In fact, Black students and other 
minority students do suffer from stereotypes and stigma based on the 
unfounded historical rationalization of racial subordination.104  Black 
students are three times as likely to be categorized as intellectually 
disabled, and one and one-half times as likely to be labeled as 
learning disabled, compared to their White peers.105  Latinx, 
American Indian, and Native Alaskans are also disproportionately 
represented in special education, especially in states where they 
represent a substantial portion of the population.106 
The intellectual rationalizations of slavery and Jim Crow, rooted in 
White Supremacy and the Eugenics Movement, included the 
comparison of White and Black skeletons and brains.107  This legacy is 
still present in the treatment of Black and Brown students, children of 
immigrants, and others among the “lower” social classes when it 
comes to educational opportunity and classification.108  Segregated 
special education classes are predominately filled with children from 
communities that are not dominant racially, ethnically, or 
linguistically in the U.S.109  This is particularly true of the special 
 
 103. See DOWD, supra, note 13, at 106; Raj, supra note 31, at 46–47. 
 104. Subini Ancy Annamma et al., Dis/ability Critical Race Studies (DisCrit): 
Theorizing at the Intersections of Race and Dis/ability 10, in DISCRIT, supra note 6. 
 105. Id. at 11 (citing T. Parrish, Racial Disparities in the Identification, Funding 
and Provision of Special Education, in RACIAL INEQUALITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 
(D.J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2002)). For a personal description of a mother’s 
struggle to assure that her Black first-grader would receive equal treatment and not 
be forced into segregated spaces, see Kathleen M. Collins, A DisCrit Perspective on 
the State of Florida v. George Zimmerman: Racism, Ableism and Youth Out of Place 
in Community and School 183, 196–201, in DIS CRIT, supra note 6. 
 106. Annamma et al., supra note 104, at 11. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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education classifications of Learning Disability, Intellectual Disability 
(formerly Mental Retardation), and Emotional Disturbance or 
Behavior Disorders,110 perhaps the most stigmatized disabilities. 
However, in the face of the argument against using existing 
disability law in education cases because of potential stigma, we have 
serious concerns.  To argue that Black children will be stigmatized by 
a claim that they suffer from one or more dis/abilities caused by their 
environments is, in our view, to argue that children with dis/abilities 
are inferior and that classifying racial minority children as having 
dis/abilities would create a double badge of inferiority.  Neither race 
nor dis/ability should create stigma.  Further, if structural factors like 
implicitly biased social institutions are causing dis/ability, we 
especially want to avoid assigning its effects to other, individual, 
causes. 
Shifting the lens to consider the argument from a different 
perspective may illuminate our position.  Assuming the law regarding 
race discrimination afforded greater protections and opportunity for 
school reform, would we be comfortable with the argument that 
children with dis/abilities who are members of non-dominant racial 
classes should not use race discrimination law to their benefit because 
doing so would call attention to their race and would further 
stigmatize them?  In other words, by claiming dis/ability is 
stigmatizing, are we re-stigmatizing persons with dis/abilities?  This is 
a tricky question because the history of viewing dis/ability as inferior, 
and the tendency to segregate children with dis/abilities — as well as 
the history of finding that racial minority children have dis/abilities — 
tends to legitimize the stigma critique.  Certainly, those using the 
stigma argument to resist the use of current disability law are using it 
out of concern for how society has constructed dis/abilities, not out of 
the belief that persons with dis/abilities are inferior.111  Still, when it 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. In Toward Unity in School Reform: What DisCrit Contributes to 
Multicultural and Inclusive Education, Susan Baglieri, using the comparison to 
Cheryl Harris’ Whiteness as Property, argues that schooling is property and that 
“[t]he discourse of school reform centers on inequalities and opportunity gaps to 
acquire schooling, as a form of property through meritocracy.” Susan Baglieri, 
Toward Unity in School Reform: What DisCrit Contributes to Multicultural and 
Inclusive Education 169, in DISCRIT, supra note 6. Instead of this neoliberal, 
capitalist approach to schooling, which she believes focuses on “at risk” children and 
reifies the racist and ableist constructions, Baglieri proposes that we: (1) “resist the 
meritocratic practice of schooling and normative assessment structure;” (2) 
“reconceptualize curriculum as being in service to communities, rather than in service 
to individuals or the economy;” and (3) “support community-based control of the 
economies built up around disability and disaster capitalism.” Id. at 177–79. 
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comes to the stigma argument, we contend scholars should resist 
accepting the idea that having a dis/ability or being a racial minority is 
stigmatizing.112  We think one best avoids this potential stigma by 
using a reinterpretation of disability law whenever it can assist 
students with issues that are linked by both race and dis/ability. 
This leaves us with the conclusion that the benefits of our 
dis/ability approach outweigh the potential for stigma.  We do worry 
about the current shunting of Black and/or Latinx kids into special 
education classes.  But the problem of complex trauma leading to 
educational differences in what students need is quite significant in 
the violence-plagued inner-city communities we are discussing.  We 
hope that a group-based approach can respond to these students’ 
needs by changing things for everyone.  Today’s disability doctrine 
might not go far enough in recognizing group harms without 
stigmatizing individuals, but we believe that it could do so. 
ii. Doctrinal Disability Law or a Dis/ability Framework? 
We also have concerns about whether the federal disability laws, as 
currently interpreted, will be useful in achieving school reform.  The 
judge’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss in the Compton 
case suggests a belief that CUSD should have responded to the 
“child-find” rules by testing children in the school district — members 
of this particular group of students may be suffering dis/ability from 
complex trauma that requires accommodation in their education.  
Otherwise, presumably, the judge would have dismissed the 
substantive claim as not “plausible.”113  The failure to certify the class 
has led to protracted settlement negotiations that may conceivably 
result in improved programs for poor children attending school in 
CUSD.  But, given how courts generally interpret disability law 
 
 112. One question is whether one should avoid linking race and dis/ability not 
because dis/ability should be stigmatized, but because, in reality, it is stigmatized. 
One could argue that we should attempt to disrupt the negative meaning of dis/ability 
but not link race to it because doing so may make things worse for racial minorities. 
We recognize this is an important question, but the use of disability law can be 
beneficial to kids like those in Compton. Hence, we decline to promote the stigma by 
refusing to use existing disability law to correct problems that are linked by both race 
and dis/ability. 
 113. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (requiring that the court regard 
the allegations in the complaint as plausible in order to survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (same). 
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narrowly, as demonstrated by Raj, we would not wish to rely merely 
on the disability law as it is often interpreted today.114 
While specific disability laws, as currently interpreted, may 
ultimately prove ineffective, certain frameworks created by those 
disability laws may be useful in serving as models for new legislation 
or judicial interpretations that would address the intersection of 
poverty and race and their effects on children.  Congress or state 
legislatures could rely on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 
the ADA, with significant changes in interpretation, to create statutes 
that would enhance the rights of poor minority children.  That said, 
given the Congress’s inability to pass progressive legislation today, it 
may be more effective to rely on the disability laws as written and to 
argue that courts interpret them more broadly.115  Furthermore, 
current state disability laws could provide further redress: either 
because the laws themselves are written more progressively than the 
federal laws or the state courts interpret them progressively.116 
We acknowledge that the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act, and IDEA emphasize the individuality of the plaintiff but we 
also see potential in the principles behind those rules.  The underlying 
reason for a focus on individuals makes sense: historically, persons 
with dis/abilities have been judged as a group as “handicapped” or 
“incapacitated.”  Especially when speaking of a child’s ability to 
perform in school or an adult’s ability to work at a particular job, the 
ability of the person to engage in major life activities would be 
relevant to the accommodations needed.  Historically, a group rather 
than an individual determination fostered stereotypes about the 
inability of individual persons to do anything that “normal” people 
can do.  For this reason, those writing the ADA and other disability 
laws were careful to require the individual determination of whether 
someone has a disability and, if so, what accommodations or 
modifications to programs are necessary to allow that individual to 
successfully perform a job, use the state program, or get an adequate 
education.117  The individual determination also allows for finetuning 
 
 114. See supra notes 83–94 (relating Raj’s critique of Compton case). 
 115. See McConnell, supra note 101, at 378 (arguing that the U.S. electorate is not 
progressive). 
 116. See, e.g., Green v. California, 165 P.3d 118, 125 (2007) (noting that the 
California legislature intended its disability law in some instances to provide more 
protections than federal law). 
 117. See Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 50–52 (2000) (explaining that stereotypes of what 
it means to be “disabled” harms individuals with disabilities who seek to avoid 
isolation). 
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of the offered service and permits the environment to be as inclusive 
as possible.  The individual determination of “disability” may make it 
very difficult to categorize people with dis/abilities into groups.  
Nonetheless, we cannot forget that IDEA and other disability laws 
resulted from a number of class actions, and we should offer 
appropriate broad-based remedies to school-based issues of children 
with disabilities.118 
Moreover, Professor Mark Weber would likely disagree with Raj’s 
limited characterization of the doctrinal law.  Although his essay does 
not address using disability law to redress racial discrimination and 
trauma and was published before Compton was filed, Weber 
examined the use of class action litigation to remedy violations of the 
IDEA statute.119  He argues compellingly that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes,120 a Title VII sex discrimination case that overturned the 
lower court’s class certification, is not the death-knell to class action 
lawsuits brought under IDEA.  There is, Weber notes, a significant 
difference between the negative requirements of Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act — not to discriminate illegally — and the affirmative 
requirements of the IDEA.  Professor Weber highlights the 
affirmative obligations imposed by IDEA on school districts: 
[They] must identify, evaluate, create appropriate programs, make 
placements in integrated settings with adequate related services, 
review the programs, etc. These are all affirmative obligations, and 
not doing any one or more of them will similarly affect all children 
for whom the defendant fails to meet the obligation.121 
The most prominent example of affirmative obligations in current 
disability law is the “child-find” requirement of the IDEA (which is 
similar to the “child-find” requirement in the Section 504 regulations, 
a violation of which is alleged by the plaintiffs in Compton).122  In 
essence, the “child-find” creates an affirmative duty for the school 
district to seek out children within the district who have disabilities 
and to assure that each child has a free and appropriate public 
 
 118. We thank Mark Weber for reminding us of this fact. Weber, supra note 102, at 
472–77(explaining the history of IDEA). 
 119. Id. 
 120. 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (holding that the lower court erred in granting the 1.5 
million plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class in a gender discrimination case under 
Title VII). 
 121. Weber, supra note 101, at 494. 
 122. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2004) (“child-find”). 
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education.123  The remedy in an IDEA class action could be to strike 
down certain policies and practices that create barriers to the rights of 
children with dis/abilities.  In Compton, one such policy could be its 
exclusive use of traditional disciplinary methods even though they are 
proven to harm children suffering from complex trauma.  Another is 
a policy to use certain teaching techniques inappropriate for children 
who suffer from complex trauma.  Alternatively, the remedy under an 
IDEA class action could be to affirmatively require school districts to 
find children with dis/abilities and provide appropriate remedies. 
At a minimum, then, under the “child-find” requirement in the 
Section 504 regulations, the Compton judge’s failure to certify a class 
seems inappropriate.  Certainly, this is the case where there is expert 
evidence that ACEs cause children to suffer emotional, mental, and 
physical disabilities that affect their ability to learn and to control 
themselves in a disciplinary environment.  This argument is even 
stronger given the evidence in Compton that scientists know how to 
improve the outcomes for these children through specific teaching, 
counseling, and disciplinary techniques. It is thus likely there is a class 
of “disabled” students that the district must find.124 
Once the screening takes place, the “child-find” requirement under 
the IDEA should reveal that a large percentage of children in CUSD 
suffer from disabilities related to ACEs and complex trauma leading 
to dis/abilities or risk of dis/abilities that can be ameliorated.  Once 
CUSD has this information, it has an obligation to modify its 
practices and procedures — teaching methodologies, teacher 
education and training, and disciplinary systems — to assure that all 
children have an appropriate education.125 
 
 123. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2012) (free, appropriate public education and related 
services); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26) (related services); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) 
(free, appropriate public education). 
 124. We are arguing that one way to find that class is to ask whether there is a 
discrete and cohesive intersectional cohort of students with shared experiences of and 
responses to ACEs. 
 125. Alternatively, plaintiffs could sue under the various disability statutes, and 
upon proof that the named plaintiffs suffered complex trauma and disabilities, the 
court should order screening (testing) as a remedy. See, e.g., Complaint at 128, D.R. 
v. Mich. Dep’t Educ., 2016 WL 6080952 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2016) (2:16-cv-13694-
AJT-APP) (alleging that schools should test all children for lead contamination and 
accommodate the children’s disabilities once it is determined that children have 
unhealthy lead levels that affect mental functioning). The court in the Flint lead case 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies and denied the defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal of the denial 
of the motion to dismiss. See D.R. v. Michigan Dep’t Educ., 2017 WL 5010773, *1 
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 2. 2017). Once the screening is complete, the school’s obligation to 
modify policies and practices to accommodate its students would arise under the 
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Current disability law’s focus on individuals may have been 
overstated.  The purpose of its individual focus is to avoid stereotypes 
— protecting persons with dis/abilities, not hindering the 
redressability of their injuries as a class.  As Part III discusses, the 
statutes assume a social construction model rather than a medical 
model of biological difference.126  If the logic of the social 
construction model were taken seriously, cases like Compton would 
be successful, as such interpretations would emphasize tearing down 
structural barriers to learning by children with dis/abilities.  
Moreover, there are already precedents in disability and Title VII law 
to guide the way.127  To explain further our approach to the scholarly 
debate over whether disability law can be used successfully to prevent 
and remedy racial inequalities, the next Part of this Article explains 
social construction theory. 
III. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION THEORY AND DIS/ABILITIES 
In this Part, we take up the challenge of comparing race and 
dis/ability by considering social construction theory.  The argument 
for a social constructionist view of race begins with acknowledging 
that race is nothing more than a social construct.  Scientists agree that 
race has no biological meaning; skin color and other physical factors 
that we identify with different racial groups do not connote 
 
ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act if the testing demonstrates that a 
substantial percentage of children are victims of complex trauma and its resulting 
disabilities. The appropriate modifications would depend on the expert testimony 
relating to what types of teacher training, curricular changes, and changes to 
restorative justice techniques are most effective in that environment. 
 126. We admit, however, that the social construction model of existing disability 
law is somewhat incomplete, and portions of the disability laws seem to contradict 
one another in that some portions seem to rely on the medical model while others 
seem to recognize the social model. In fact, the different models are apparent in the 
definition of disability under the ADA. That statute states: 
The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual– 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
the major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph 
(3)). 
42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1990). Sections A and B speak of a physical or mental impairment, 
which seems to point toward the medical model. Section C, however, focuses on 
whether others consider the individual to have an impairment, which seems clearly to 
be consistent with the social model. Moreover, other sections of the statute or 
regulations requiring reasonable accommodations to an individual’s disability and 
modifications to policies or practices recognize that social barriers are dis/abling. See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1990); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (7)(i); (8) (1991). 
 127. See infra note 193 (discussing cases). 
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biologically significant differences.128  In fact, some modern genetic 
researchers have called for the elimination of race as a category 
because it is a weak proxy for the study of genetic diversity.129  As a 
scientific matter, then, there is no such thing as race.  Race is just the 
social meaning associated with discernible patterns in physical 
appearance.130 
By saying that race is a social construct, we mean that society 
creates racial categories and imbues them with meanings, which often 
change across place and time.131  For example, a century ago, people 
in the United States spoke of Jews, the Irish, and Southern Italians as 
belonging to races other than White, whereas today we conceive of 
these groups as White.132  In the United States an infinitesimal 
amount of black “blood” was sufficient to categorize a person as 
Black.133  In other societies, such as Brazil, people who have different 
proportions of Black ancestry are considered to constitute different 
races.134  In essence, communities create race, a category that reflects 
status, acceptance (or non-acceptance), and societal privilege (or lack 
of privilege).  Professors of Ethnic Studies and Sociology Michael 
Omi and Howard Winant thus defined racial formation theory: race’s 
meanings are formed in specific cultural moments, not found in 
 
 128. Megan Gannon, Race Is a Social Construct, Scientists Argue, SCI. AM. (Feb. 
6, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/essay/race-is-a-social-construct-
scientists-argue/ [https://perma.cc/S593-9AZR]. 
 129. Id.; see also Michael Yudell et al., Taking Race Out of Human Genetics, 351 
SCI. 564, 364–65 (2016). 
 130. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S 55 (1986) (defining race). 
 131. See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE 
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE xiii (1996) (declaring, “race is highly contingent, 
specific to times, places, and situations”). The definitive statement on the value of 
socially constructing whiteness for Whites is Cheryl Harris’s Whiteness as Property, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). 
 132. The fact that race is a social construction can be observed from the debate on 
this point. While major experts have written about how these groups have “become 
white” eventually in the United States, the question about whether this is true seems 
to depend on the definition of “becoming white.” See, e.g., KAREN BRODKIN, HOW 
JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS AND WHAT THAT SAYS ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA 
(1998); NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995); DAVID ROEDIGER, 
THE WAGES OF WHITENESS (1991). If it is a racial classification, it is false; but if it 
demonstrates status in the community, these groups do “become White.” See Phillip 
Q. Yang & Kavitha Koshy, The “Becoming White” Thesis Revisited, 8 J. PUB. & 
PROF. PSYCH. 1, 3 (2016). In either event, both those who pose and oppose the 
“becoming White” theory agree that race is socially constructed. See id. at 2. 
 133. OMI & WINANT, supra note 130, at 53. 
 134. See ANTHONY MARX, MAKING RACE AND NATION: A COMPARISON OF 
SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND BRAZIL 66–68, 74 (1998) (comparing racial 
formation in the United States, Brazil, and South Africa). 
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nature.135  Law is an especially significant way in which the meanings 
of race have been formed in the United States.136 
Although race is not real biologically, it is real socially.  As one of 
us has previously declared, “[t]hose stereotypes 
are materially consequential in that they influence the distribution of 
social goods.”137  Ignoring race is not an option because it is built into 
the structures of society, and it affects the daily lives of all people.  
For instance, certain racial and ethnic accents, names, and skin tones 
often trigger biased behaviors in this country.138 
Dis/ability, too, is a social construction.  Historically, people 
thought of dis/ability under the medical model.139  Dis/ability was 
something in a person’s physical or mental structure.  The social 
model of dis/ability explains that impairments or differences, although 
material, become dis/abilities because of limitations imposed by 
society.140  According to Professor Samuel Bagenstos, dis/ability 
rights advocates believe that a dis/ability “results from the interaction 
 
 135. OMI & WINANT, supra note 130, at 59–61. 
 136. See id. at 57–69 (centering law in defining racial formation). 
 137. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Our First Unisex President?: Black Masculinity and 
Obama’s Feminine Side, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 633, 643 (2009). 
 138. See e.g., Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical Race Theory of 
Evidence, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2243, 2295 (2017) (“Those same traits [speaking Spanish 
or speaking English with a Latinx accent] are then associated with qualities like being 
uneducated, dirty, and prone to violence.”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario 
L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title 
VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283 
(2005) (considering bias against individuals with names that connote non-white 
ethnicity on resumes); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 
DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000) (highlighting ongoing colorism). Some people argue the law 
should be colorblind while ignoring the crippling effects of racial categories in our 
history and today. See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: 
COLORBLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (5th ed. 
2017) (“Shielded by color blindness, whites can express resentment towards 
minorities; criticize their morality, values, and work ethic; and even claim to be the 
victims of ‘reverse racism.’”). A denial of dis/ability, impairment, or difference 
(whatever the label and cause) shares a similar omission, as it may deny the historical 
paternalistic policies directed at persons with different abilities and would make 
current modifications of policies and practices and removals of barriers more 
difficult. While society may ultimately reach colorblind and ability-blind views and 
practices, it is necessary in the meantime to correct the problems of the past (and the 
present) to consider both color and impairment in shaping remedies that work to 
overcome those problems. 
 139. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 6, 18 (2009). 
 140. See DISABILITY NOTTINGHAMSHIRE, The Social Model vs. the Medical Model 
of Disability, http://www.disabilitynottinghamshire.org.uk/about/social-model-vs-
medical-model-of-disability/ [https://perma.cc/2G7E-E7AZ] (last visited Jan. 27, 
2020). 
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between some physical or mental characteristic labeled an 
‘impairment’ and the contingent societal decisions that have made 
physical and social structures inaccessible to people with that 
condition.”141  For example, a person who uses a wheelchair who is 
fully capable of working can be limited by the building in which she 
works because it has no ramp.142  Likewise, someone with a history of 
mental illness may be denied the break time he needs to 
accommodate his difference at the workplace, and therefore end up 
on the unemployment rolls.  An employer might also refuse to hire 
someone who has HIV out of an irrational fear they will spread AIDS 
or miss work because of illness.143  This is the “disabling” of the 
“disabled.”144 
Dis/ability rights advocates believe that society has a responsibility 
to eliminate barriers that create difficulty for persons with physical or 
mental impairments.145  This position discourages society from seeing 
persons with dis/abilities as pitiable, “charity cases,” and encourages 
the elimination of barriers our society has created for persons with 
impairments or differences.146  Some advocates argue there is no 
dividing line between persons with dis/abilities and those without, but 
merely a range of abilities.  Professor Bagenstos explains that this 
view holds that “the law should treat disability as a universal trait, one 
we all possess in one way or another.”147  Conversely, other dis/ability 
advocates argue that if we do not recognize impairments that, 
combined with the environment, cause dis/abilities, we cannot remedy 
through the law the lack of access to social goods that persons with 
impairments suffer.148  Although we tend to agree that people are on 
 
 141. BAGENSTOS, supra note 139, at 6.  For a nuanced argument about the 
relationship between social construction and embodiment in dis/abilities theory, see 
generally Tobin Siebers, Disability and the Theory of Complex Embodiment — For 
Identity Politics in a New Register, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER (5th ed. 
2016) (suggesting directions for a dis/abilities theory that is grounded in social 
construction theory, embodiment theory, and analysis of identities). 
 142. Id. at 7. 
 143. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (concluding that a 
woman with asymptomatic HIV had a disability under Title III of the ADA). 
 144. See JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF 
“SEX” 232 (1993) (discussing the “girling” of the “girl”). 
 145. BAGENSTOS, supra note 139, at 7. 
 146. Id.; see also Rebecca Atkinson, Viewpoint: Is It Time to Stop Using the Term 
“Disability”?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-ouch-
34385738 [https://perma.cc/DYV3-DGTZ] (discussing preferred terminology for 
“disability”). 
 147. BAGENSTOS, supra note 139, at 8. 
 148. Id. 
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a series of continuums of abilities, the nature and social impact of 
which can change over time, we believe that antidiscrimination law is 
necessary to break down barriers that persons with dis/abilities face. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider how physical and mental 
impairments, perceived or real, combine with our environments to 
create barriers that the law can remedy. 
There is one goal that unifies the dis/ability community: the desire 
to avoid the historic paternalistic medicalization of dis/ability and 
treatment by parents, medical professionals, and bureaucrats that 
deprived persons with dis/abilities of freedom and control over their 
own lives.149  The dis/ability rights movement, which spurred the 
passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, is a diverse 
community with “different life experiences, different material needs, 
and different ideological perspectives.”150  It includes those with very 
differing dis/abilities, known and unknown, who have various beliefs 
about how much assimilation they would like, or even if they want to 
be recognized as having a dis/ability at all.151  Yet persons with 
dis/abilities agree that they should have the freedom to make their 
own choices.  The ADA was an attempt to enable persons in the 
dis/abled community to gain freedom and control by granting access 
to the workplace and public accommodations in privately-owned 
businesses (such as restaurants, hotels, and professional offices), as 
well as to public institutions and environments (like schools, courts, 
parks, and even jails).152 
Where there is a relevant intersectional cohort, existing disability 
law, understood in light of the social construction model of dis/ability, 
is capable of incorporating group based theories.153  The language of 
the statutes, the case law, and scholarly publications have already 
acknowledged this fact.154  Once one recognizes that society dis/ables 
 
 149. Id. at 4. 
 150. Id. at 3. 
 151. Id. at 3–4. 
 152. See Pa. Dep’t. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (concluding that 
Title II applies to state prisons); LAURA ROTHSTEIN & ANN C. MCGINLEY, 
DISABILITY LAW, CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 11–13 (6th ed. 2017). 
 153. To be clear, we do not think this is a case of “either/or” (individual or group). 
We want to expand the ability to certify a class based on a sufficiently discrete and 
cohesive intersectional cohort without removing existing disability law’s capacity to 
accommodate individuals in appropriate cases. 
 154. Bradley Areheart, Disability Trouble, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347 (2011) 
(concluding that not only dis/ability but also impairments are socially constructed); 
McGowan, supra note 117, at 53–63, 112–29 (2000) (arguing that large portions of the 
ADA recognize that disability is socially constructed such as the reasonable 
accommodations requirement and the fact that one who is “regarded as” having a 
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people, one can understand that dis/abling social barriers often 
operate upon social groups.  Lack of wheelchair access affects the 
group of people who do not walk steps as a whole, refusal to 
accommodate mental illness affects the group of people with mental 
health conditions, and having HIV is associated with a particular 
social group.  If society constructs dis/ability, it can surely act upon 
whole social groups.  What remains to be seen is how to identify the 
relevant socially dis/abled group in a class action and how this affects 
the critique of the Compton case’s denial of class certification. 
IV. WHY THE COMPTON STUDENTS SHOULD GET CLASS STATUS AS 
“PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES” 
The Compton case is a good example of how dis/ability is socially 
constructed, including when it intersects with social positions such as 
race and social locations such as the inner-city.155  Our intersectional 
cohort theory, which we expound in this Part, demonstrates that 
individuals with similar identities, environments, and experiences 
often suffer similar results.  Consistent with current disability law, the 
Compton court could have recognized these facts instead of initially 
denying the class certification and refusing the temporary injunction’s 
broad remedy. 
A. Intersectionality Theory and Cohorts 
We find it helpful to focus on young Black male students in inner-
city neighborhoods as an example of intersectional cohort theory.  We 
are aware that this is a fraught enterprise.  Social construction theory 
says there is no fixed meaning of characteristics like youth, race, and 
gender except as they are socially defined in specific social 
contexts.156  Anti-essentialism theory, which also emerges from 
poststructuralism, says we should not assume there is an essence to 
identities such as being young, black, or male.157  As criminologists 
 
disability actually is defined as having a disability); cf. Adam M. Samaha, What Good 
Is the Social Model of Disability? 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1251–54 (2000) 
(recognizing the social construction theory of dis/ability but arguing that it is not 
useful). 
 155. See supra note 3 (defining and distinguishing social position and social 
location). 
 156. See supra Part III (discussing social construction theory). 
 157. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (defining gender essentialism as “the notion that a 
unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and described independently 
of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience”). 
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Kathryn Henne and Emily Troshynski recently put it, “attempts to 
distinguish ‘Blackness’ or ‘womanhood’ . . . inevitably construct 
identities in essentialist ways.”158  Prime examples of the need for 
anti-essentialism are the ways White women’s experiences have stood 
in for all women and Black men’s experiences have represented all 
Blacks in the feminist and antiracist movements.159  Intersectionality 
theory takes this insight in another direction by trying to figure out 
the ways in which identities are more complex than their essentialized 
versions.160  In this Section, we explore the implication of 
intersectionality theory when it is applied to intersectionally-defined, 
discrete, and cohesive groups.161 
 
 158. Kathryn Henne & Emily I. Troshynski, Intersectional Criminologies for the 
Contemporary Moment: Crucial Questions of Power, Praxis, and Criminological 
Control, 27 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 55, 58 (2019). 
 159. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and 
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140; see also Carbado & Harris, supra 
note 27, at 2201 (2019) (summarizing Crenshaw’s views on anti-essentialism). 
 160. Carbado & Harris say:  
Intersectionality is not an argument against essentialism per se. Nor is 
intersectionality com- mitted to anti-essentialism per se. Our view is that 
judging a particular analysis to be essentialist does not settle normative 
questions; rather, the important consideration is whether the deployment of 
essentialism is justified empirically and normatively in a particular context. 
See Carbado & Harris, supra note 27, at 2204. We agree if we define “essentialism” 
to be a neutral term describing how persons of certain characteristics can represent a 
group with similar characteristics and experiences (Black women, Black children 
living in inner city neighborhoods, etc.). But of course, we understand Carbado and 
Harris as not approving of the type of essentialism (all women’s experiences can be 
represented by White women’s experiences) that Crenshaw spoke against. See id. 
(distinguishing anti-essentialism and intersectionality theory). While intersectionality 
theory might not be per se anti-essentialist, we think a sensible application of 
intersectionality theory presumes that some essentialist moves are illegitimate but 
others, like that embodied by intersectional cohort theory, are legitimate. 
 161. Collins identifies a number of assumptions that are prevalent in 
intersectionality scholarship.  She says that one or more of these assumptions is 
always present, though some may be absent, and the configuration varies. Collins, 
supra note 29, at 14. Here is a summary of her list: 
 “Race, class, gender, sexuality, age, ability, nation, ethnicity, and similar 
categories . . . are best understood in relational terms . . . ”; 
 Categories of identity create power relations — racism, sexism, classism, 
and related prejudices — that are interrelated; 
 The power relations influence social formations that are organized 
around unequal distribution of material relations and social experiences; 
 Social formations are “historically contingent and cross-culturally 
specific,” varying across times and places; 
 Individuals differentially positioned “within intersecting systems of 
power” develop “different points of view on their own and others’ 
experiences . . . ”; 
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Intersectionality theory is a set162 of insights stemming from the 
critique of the “single-axis framework” for thinking about 
identities.163  The single-axis framework generalizes the experiences 
of racial or gender subordination, for example, by assuming that if an 
employer does not discriminate against all Blacks or all Whites, it 
cannot be discriminating against Black women.  That assumption is 
false, as (mostly White male) employers may feel solidarity with their 
Black male peers and White female peers, but hold negative 
stereotypes about Black women.164  Sociologist Kathy Davis adds that 
intersectionality theorists should investigate the “interaction[s] 
between gender, race, and other categories of difference in individual 
lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural 
ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of 
power.”165 
Broadly speaking, we are interested in the relationship between 
individual identity formation and social structures.166  By identity 
formation, we mean the processes of development of an internal 
sense of self-identity and performance of one’s identity in order to 
negotiate against others’ attributions of identity to the individual.  
 
 Social formations of inequality “are fundamentally unjust,” thus sparking 
“engagements that uphold or contest the status quo.” 
Id. Collins also identifies six themes in the topics of intersectional analyses. See id. at 
11–13 (thematizing current work). 
 162. We agree with legal anthropologist Khiara Bridges’s persuasive argument that 
there is not, and should not be, one true intersectionality methodology. See BRIDGES, 
supra note 29, at 247 (“Indeed, crafting the theory in a way that limits its capacity 
may be ill-advised.”); accord Devon Carbado, Colorblind Intersectionality, 38 SIGNS: 
J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 811, 841 (2013) (suggesting scholars “push the 
theoretical boundaries of intersectionality rather than disciplining and policing 
them”). 
 163. Crenshaw, supra note 159, at 140. 
 164. See id. at 141–50 (describing cases failing to recognize uniqueness of 
discrimination against Black women). 
 165. Davis, supra note 29, at 68. 
 166. See id. at 14 (declaring that people develop “different points of view on their 
own . . . experiences,” highly influenced by “their subject position within intersecting 
systems of power”). Note, as well, that intersectionality theory is born out of a 
modified poststructuralist model of identity as socially constructed. See Patricia Hill 
Collins, “What’s Going On?”: Black Feminist Thought and the Politics of 
Postmodernism, in WORKING IN THE RUINS: FEMINIST POSTSTRUCTURALIST THEORY 
AND METHODS IN EDUCATION 28, 35 (Elizabeth A. St. Pierre & Wanda S. Pillow eds., 
2000) (arguing poststructuralist interrogation of linguistic oppositions is valuable to 
intersectionality theory). However, Crenshaw soundly dismissed “vulgar 
constructionism,” which suggests that race has no appropriate role in understanding 
peoples’ experiences or behaviors. See Crenshaw, supra note 28, at 1296–98 
(challenging courts’ use of constructionism to thwart political progress by racial 
minorities). 
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Defining this three-part summary of the processes of identity 
formation will help show how the concept of intersectional cohorts 
bridges the gap between micro- and macro-levels of analysis. 
When considering the Compton case, the relationship between 
identity formation and social structure plays out as follows.  First, the 
intersection of categories of identity affects people’s senses of self.  
That is significant here because being at a particular intersection of 
race, gender, class, age, and geography affects the Compton plaintiffs’ 
subjective experiences of their complex trauma and their schooling.  
Second, the intersection of categories of identity creates unique 
attributed identities, or stereotypes about the meanings of a person’s 
identities.167  We should thus expect the Compton plaintiffs to be 
treated similarly by society — through group-based discrimination — 
in terms of the racial, gender, class, and geographic discrimination 
that contributes to their complex trauma.  Third, people “negotiate” 
between their self-identities and attributed identities by “performing” 
their identities in ways meant to get society to treat them the way they 
want to be treated.  However, society is complex; social systems 
themselves, such as the family, housing, and criminal justice, can 
intersect in ways that exacerbate subordination.168  Here, the 
Compton school system’s failure to address the students’ complex 
trauma exacerbates the complex trauma that the housing system 
 
 167. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, 
Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 883 
n.162 (2006) (“Identity performance theory relies on distinctions between the 
components of self-identity and attributed identity on the one hand and the process 
of identity negotiation on the other.”); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, 
Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1264–65, 1268 (analyzing relationship 
between sense of self, stereotypes, and identity performance); cf. Collins, supra note 
29, at 14 (“Individuals and groups differentially placed within intersecting systems of 
power have different points of view on . . . others’ experiences” that are highly 
influenced by “their social locations within power relations.”). 
 168. This is “systems intersectionality.” See Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private 
Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race, and 
Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1427 (2012) (“These intersections are 
constituted by a variety of social forces that situate women of color within contexts 
structured by various social hierarchies and that render them disproportionally 
available to certain punitive policies and discretionary judgments that dynamically 
reproduce these hierarchies.”); Dorothy Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the 
Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1491 (2012) (“The 
analysis of the roles black mothers play in both the prison and foster care systems 
reveals that these systems intersect with each other to jointly perpetuate unjust 
hierarchies of race, class, and gender.”); Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially 
Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the Policing of Black Women in Subsidized 
Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 1544 (2012) (illustrating how policing and housing 
systems are entwined). 
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(segregation), legal system (overpolicing of poor, young, racial 
minorities in urban areas), and other social systems create for 
Compton students.169  The similarities in these students’ senses of self, 
attributed identities, and environmental influences make them a 
discrete and cohesive intersectional cohort based on the common 
societal treatment they receive.170 
The above understanding of the relationship between identity 
formation and social structure allows us to define an intersectional 
cohort as a cluster of people who share similar experiences, self-
identities, attributed identities, and identity performances to the 
extent that it is appropriate to think of them as a discrete and 
cohesive group in relation to a particular issue.  In Crenshaw’s 
analysis of employment discrimination cases, Black women were an 
appropriate intersectional cohort to consider because they were 
similarly discriminated against by means of the same type of 
reasoning.  Whether caused by explicit or implicit factors, the 
employers (who are generally White men) favored both Black men 
and White women over Black women. This is because the employers 
share maleness with Black men and whiteness with White women.171  
From the courts’ points of view, there could not be discrimination 
against individual Black women based on race or sex because the 
employers had hired or retained Black men and White women.172  
Understanding Black women as a relevant intersectional cohort 
explained the discrimination at hand.  Only then could we see that 
Black women’s intersecting race-gender identities made them 
vulnerable to a specific form of discrimination that was still a group 
based claim. 
Considering who constitutes the relevant intersectional cohort in a 
situation assists with one of intersectionality theory’s most vexing 
questions: how specific to be about individuals’ identities.  We could 
specify every characteristic of every individual in every context — as 
in noting that Chiron is a skinny, dark-skinned, Black, gay male high 
school student living in inner-city Miami who is poor and has a drug-
addicted mother — or we could just specify some of the larger factors 
at play that he shares with a discrete and cohesive group: racism, 
being an inner-city resident, and classism.  Our argument that we can 
 
 169. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing systems 
intersectionality). 
 170. See supra note 8 (defining “discrete” and “cohesive vis a vis intersectional 
cohorts). 
 171. See Crenshaw, supra note 159, at 148 (making this argument). 
 172. See id. 
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identify relevant intersectional cohorts builds upon Collins’s insight 
that there is a meso-level in between the micro-level of individuals 
and the macro-level of society-wide structures, in which discrete, 
cohesive social groups share similar qualities and experiences.173 
The micro-level is that of the intersectionally-defined individual.174  
The processes of identity formation are appropriate concerns of 
analysis at the micro level.  The problem with analyzing only at that 
level is that it “can make addressing more large-scale questions using 
generalized criteria impossible.”175  Sometimes we need to identify a 
pattern of discrimination based on race, gender, class, and so on, and 
that can be hard to do if one must specify every micro-level difference 
among individuals. 
Next, the macro-level is the level of the social structure writ large.  
Whereas individual decisions about the meaning of someone’s 
gender, race, class, and so on occur at the micro-level of identity 
formation, societal power relations around identities of gender, race, 
class, and so on occur at the macro-level of society.176  White 
supremacist norms (broadly speaking, racism), hegemonic 
masculinities (broadly speaking, patriarchy), and discourses about 
“makers” and “takers” (broadly speaking, classism), are examples of 
macro-level phenomena.177  Accordingly, “the analysis of the 
structural positioning of large groups is, above all, grounded in the 
macro level.”178  The concern at this level is “to be able to detect 
relevancies and correlations.”179  To understand a problem like the 
complex trauma caused to poor Black and/or Latinx students in inner 
cities, then, we need to be able to detect patterns in ACEs and their 
causation of trauma. 
Finally, the meso-level is the in-between level of identities, such as 
that of organizations, institutions, and communities.180  Meso-level 
organizations and institutions include families, churches, and political 
 
 173. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, FIGHTING WORDS: BLACK WOMEN AND THE 
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 226–27 (1998) (distinguishing levels of sociological analysis). 
Collins acknowledges that “all of these levels work together recursively.” Id. at 227 
(distinguishing levels of sociological analysis). 
 174. See Winker & Degele, supra note 32, at 52–53 (identifying levels of analysis). 
 175. Id. at 53. 
 176. See id. at 55 (describing “sociostructural level”). 
 177. See id. (connecting gender, class, and race to heteronormativism, classism, and 
racism) 
 178. Id. at 53. 
 179. Id. at 57. 
 180. See id. at 52–53 (distinguishing levels of society and discussing Patricia Hill 
Collins’s “matrix of domination”). 
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groups,181 while meso-level communities include discrete and 
cohesive social groups.182  Collins’s example of meso level identity is 
Black women in the Jim Crow South.  These women were “outsiders-
within,” who had to work in domestic service jobs that threatened 
their dignity and sexual autonomy.183  That is, they were clearly 
demarcated as socially marginalized but were forced to work in close 
quarters with Whites.  This subjected them to verbal abuse and sexual 
assault, so they developed networks to pass on information about how 
to deal with their status.184  At bus stops, in churches, and in homes, 
they defined ways to be working Black women, creating a discrete 
and cohesive social group at the meso-level.185  Their example of 
shared qualities, experiences, and responses seems to apply to all 
intersectionally-defined cohorts with sufficient discreteness and 
cohesiveness. 
Our middle-ground method avoids the problems of reducing the 
analysis to the characteristics of each individual and of over-
generalizing by essentializing characteristics such as race or gender.  
As German sociologists Gabriele Winker and Nina Degele put it: 
[I]t is advisable to divide the areas of subject matter . . . into groups 
or types.  The types . . . resemble each other more than others in 
terms of particular features . . . [and] must exhibit the highest 
possible internal homogeneity and, on the other hand, be 
characterized by a sufficient level of external heterogeneity when 
compared to each other.186 
In fact, scholars already identify intersectional cohorts when they 
describe their subjects on more than just the basis of a single-axis of 
identity, but not in such a specific way that it approaches the 
vanishing point of purely individual analysis. 
We thus propose a new focus for intersectional theory: 
consideration of the impact of relevant discrete and cohesive meso-
level groups, intersectional cohorts, on social and legal analysis.  We 
assert that intersectionality has always been a cohort theory.  It has 
always wondered whether social groups were being described 
sufficiently specifically under, for instance, employment 
discrimination law, without making the claim that everybody should 
 
 181. See COLLINS, supra note 173, at 6–7 (identifying spaces where Black women 
forged collective ideas). 
 182. See supra note 8. 
 183. See id. at 5 (defining term). 
 184. See id. at 6–7. 
 185. See id. at 226–27 (distinguishing levels of society). 
 186. Winker & Degele, supra note 32, at 60 (internal quotation omitted). 
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have a suit based on their particular set of identity characteristics.  We 
call for evaluating whether a potential intersectional cohort includes 
people sharing similar experiences, self-identities, attributed 
identities, and identity performances making them a discrete and a 
cohesive group with respect to a particular context and on a specific 
issue.  Although Professor Crenshaw and those following her 
implicitly recognized that intersectionality theory required the 
application of some essentialism (i.e. the effect of discrimination on 
Black women), what is new here is the open admission that some 
form of justifiable essentialism is necessary and a method for 
determining what is the relevant level of specificity needed to make 
the claim justifiable. 
With this approach in mind, poor Black and Latinx students of all 
genders in high-crime inner-city neighborhoods strike us as relevant 
intersectional cohorts. In fact, the social science data demonstrates 
that this group forms a cohort that suffers disproportionately from 
disabilities caused by complex trauma.  Students like those in 
Compton are a discrete group because their shared characteristics and 
unique experiences make them a coherent set of individuals that is 
different from many other social groups.  The students are cohesive 
and sufficiently homogenous in that they share identity characteristics 
and similar experiences along a number of axes.  There are many 
shared ways of being an inner-city racial minority student, including 
dress, musical taste, and responses to interpersonal conflict (such as 
various forms of “cool poses”).187  The Compton students are also 
united as a group or cohort because they are subject to racism, 
classism, violence, and so on, in ways that are not true of inner-city 
White students or suburban Black students.188 
Understanding the Compton plaintiffs as an intersectional cohort 
helps reveal that they have a group-based theory of the case: this 
particular environment causes complex trauma and emotional, 
mental, and physical disabilities to particular types of people as a 
group.  The meso-level intersectional cohort is defined by being (1) 
Black and/or Latinx, (2) schoolchildren, (3) who live in violence-torn 
communities, (4) in the inner-city.  If members of the cohort are 
suffering complex trauma, they are being subjected to it because they 
are members of this specific group.  That is so because of the 
 
 187. See VICTOR RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO 
BOYS xiv (2011) (discussing identities of young inner-city Black and Latinx males). 
 188. Cf. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion 
at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1104–05 (2008) (showing race mattered 
even when class held constant when White communities wanted to expand). 
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structural racism that leads to poverty-stricken inner-city violence-
torn neighborhoods like those in Compton and because of the 
interpersonal racism that members of these communities often 
experience as group-based harms. 
B. Why the Concept of Intersectional Cohorts Requires a Remedy in 
Compton 
The form that complex trauma takes in students — like those in the 
Compton suit — is specific to subgroups based on their particular 
experiences as members of cohorts defined by shared combinations of 
race, gender, class, dis/ability, sexual orientation, religion, age, 
geography, and other significant identities.  In reality, if not in law, it 
is the intersection of racism, poverty, and an inner-city environment 
that does most of the work in creating complex (and racialized) 
trauma for Compton’s students.  This intersectional cohort is 
particularly subject to ACEs and complex trauma that impacts the 
type of schooling they need. 
We acknowledge that existing disability statutes are built on the 
assumption that every individual will prove their disability, but we 
contend that such an understanding of the disability statutes is 
incomplete.189  Accepting the constructivist model of dis/ability, as the 
majority of scholars and many legislators do,190 requires thinking 
about dis/ability as resulting from socially-constructed barriers.191 
In this view, societal norms can disable individuals.  The statutory 
regime of disability law should see eliminating those barriers as its 
prime directive.192  Such an interpretation would allow a class action 
under disability law in situations where societal and environmental 
factors are dis/abling a relevant intersectional cohort.  The members 
of the relevant intersectional cohort — the group against which 
 
 189. See supra Part II.B.ii (discussing statutory regime). 
 190. See, e.g., Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability (2000), 
http://contracabal.info/cc-com/PDF/The%20Definition%20of%20Disability.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9W2D-EX9P] (noting that important parts of the ADA, for 
example, are based on the notion of social construct, among them, defining disability 
as including persons who are perceived to be impaired or disabled, and the 
reasonable accommodation requirement); Areheart, supra note 154, at 348–49 
(noting that many scholars see disability as a social construct and arguing that 
impairment itself may be socially constructed); McGowan, supra note 117, at 53–63, 
112–20 (arguing that a good portion of the ADA includes provisions that recognize 
that disability is a social construct). 
 191. See supra Part III (analyzing social construction thesis). 
 192. See supra notes 139–47 (identifying statutory goal of removing barriers). 
2020]   INTERSECTIONAL COHORTS, DIS/ABILITY, AND CLASS ACTIONS 335 
society throws up barriers — would be (rebuttably) presumed to be 
legitimate members of the class. 
Under our approach, defendants may argue in the remedial phase 
of the case that particular individuals have not suffered from the 
barriers to learning existing in the defendants’ school district, but they 
could not say there should be no class certification solely on the 
theory that every individual will respond differently to the barriers.193  
Such an argument would be a truism: individuals necessarily could 
respond differently.  But once we recognize that an intersectional 
cohort has similar experiences and some shared responses, it makes 
sense to presume that members of the cohort are similarly affected 
until such time as the defendant can prove otherwise as to specific 
individuals. 
Children like Chiron often fall behind in school because of 
societally created barriers, and when these children suffer from 
disabilities as a result of these barriers, disability law needs to 
recognize that the only way to remedy this harm is to create class 
remedies.  Here, the very detailed allegations in the Compton case as 
well as the evidence presented at the hearing on the plaintiffs’ 
motions for class certification and injunctive relief make it clear that a 
significant percentage of children in the school district suffer ACEs 
and complex trauma, and that complex trauma had lead to difficulties 
in a large percentage of children’s learning and responding to school 
discipline.194  At the pre-trial stages, a court should be able to certify a 
 
 193. This is consistent with the holding in United States v. Denver, 943 F. Supp. 
1304 (D. Colo. 1996), an ADA pattern and practice case where the court held that it 
is not necessary to demonstrate that each member of the class has been victimized by 
the defendant’s policy in the liability stage of a disability pattern or practice case. 
Denver is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence in Title VII. In a pattern or 
practices race discrimination case under Title VII, the plaintiffs may show a pattern 
or practice by demonstrating a statistical imbalance combined with anecdotal 
evidence of race discrimination in the workplace. Once that showing is met, the 
employer is known to engage in a pattern or practice of race discrimination. At that 
point, the defendant has lost but has the right to prove that individual members of the 
class would not have been hired or promoted absent race discrimination. Thus, it is 
only in this remedial stage of the litigation when the individual’s suffering from race 
discrimination arises, and at this point, because the plaintiff has already proved that 
the employer engages in race discrimination as a practice, it is the employer’s burden 
to prove that individual members of the class did not suffer based on race 
discrimination. See Int’l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336–42, 
360–62 (1977). This is the model that should be used for the cohort cases. 
 194. First Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 73–122; P.P. v. Compton 
Unified Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 5752770, at *6 (Sept. 29, 2015) (noting that the expert 
affidavits aver that nearly 25% of students in the district have suffered multiple ACEs 
and/or complex trauma). 
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class if sufficient allegations and preliminary evidence of damage to a 
significant portion of the relevant intersectional cohort exist, 
combined with affidavits demonstrating that a significant portion of 
the children in the district suffer ACEs and complex trauma.195 
Since the ADA already contemplates both pattern and practice 
disparate impact lawsuits196 brought by groups, there is no reason not 
to recognize the Compton class.197  At its core, disability law requires 
schools to modify policies and practices that create barriers to 
 
 195. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) requires that all class actions have: (a) a sufficiently 
numerous group (“numerosity”); (b) common questions of law and fact affecting the 
group (“commonality”); (c) with the named plaintiff(s)’ bringing claims typical of the 
class (“typicality”); and (d) the named plaintiff(s)’ being an “adequate” 
representative of the class (“adequacy”). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Beyond this basic 
requirement, Rule 23(b) sets forth three types of class actions. A Rule 23(b)(3) 
damages class action is problematic for this type of case because it requires that 
common questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions and that a 
class action be superior to individual adjudication of damage claims. This seems like 
such a situation, where the individuals in the class experience, as a group, important 
contributors to their complex trauma, including racism and the effects of urbaphobia 
(such as over-policing). However, both a Rule 23(b)(1) “prejudice” class action (a 
shorthand name because this type of action seeks to avoid prejudicing the defendant 
due to inconsistent decisions involving class members) or a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive 
class action, particularly the latter, appear apt vehicles for adjudicating this type of 
claim. Rule 23(b)(2), for example, permits class actions where “the party opposing 
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that generally apply to the class, so 
that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate 
respecting the class as a whole.” See BROOKE D. COLEMAN ET AL., LEARNING CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 410–20 (3d ed. 2018). Plaintiffs’ theory of the case is that the School 
District has failed to take reasonable measures to reduce the dis/abling effects of 
ACEs trauma for the class members and that this requires court intervention via 
injunction to require defendants to improve the school environment. Although there 
is ample division among courts regarding class actions, this use of the class action — 
to require the defendants to act to provide a safer environment — seems appropriate. 
Courts have used class action injunctive power to administer prisons, medical 
institutions, schools (including complex and controversial desegregation and busing 
plans), police departments, and other organizations or workforces. There is no reason 
to think courts less capable of improving the trauma-producing environment of 
Compton. See generally Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). In addition, partial class action may 
proceed regarding liability only or the court may order the class divided into sub-
classes for more efficient administration or to focus on particular facilities and 
policies affecting particular members of the class. 
 196. See Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate 
Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 879–901 (2006) (noting the decline of 
disparate impact class actions in disability employment discrimination cases and 
arguing for a theory of pan-disability in which even though individuals with certain 
dis/abilities might see themselves as heterogeneous, a class action should lie when 
others define them as within the same category). 
 197. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (allowing disparate impact 
suits); see supra note 19 (discussing class actions in disability law cases). 
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children with disabilities who attend or wish to attend their school 
unless the school can prove that such modifications would cause a 
fundamental alteration of their school programs.198  In the Compton 
case, barriers such as teaching and disciplinary procedures could be 
modified to grant children meaningful access to education.  At least in 
the liability phase of a lawsuit, where the plaintiffs request class 
certification and support it with credible expert evidence, the courts 
should adopt a rebuttable presumption that children belonging to 
particular intersectional cohorts based on race, experience, and 
environment have suffered complex trauma and a disability that falls 
under the statute.  This is especially appropriate once the plaintiffs 
have alleged and offered evidence that the science supports a finding 
of widespread dis/ability among children facing the circumstances at 
hand.  Later in the remedial phase of the litigation, the defendants 
may attempt to rebut the presumption as to individual students.199 
The constructivist model contradicts the preference for an 
individual injury in the current interpretations of the federal 
statutes.  Social construction is already understood to affect cohorts, 
not individuals.  Even when we consider intersectionality, which is a 
must even when we are generalizing, sub-groups such as poor, young 
transgender Chicano women constitute a discrete and cohesive group 
with many shared experiences.  As a matter of discrimination based 
on attributed identities, discriminatory social norms at the 
intersection of class, age, queerness, ethnicity, and gender treat the 
sub-group the same and affect the entire cohort.  Likewise, if a 
positive or negative social environment affects ability, it will affect 
cohorts as well as individuals.  This group effect is especially likely 
when the social environment includes group-based discrimination on 
bases such as race, class, and geography.  Hence, when the complaint 
alleges the types of conditions existing in Compton, harm suffered by 
various plaintiffs, and science supporting the causal link between the 
environment and harm, requiring proof that every member of the 
purported class suffers a disability contradicts the underlying reality 
of how these disabilities arise.  The fact that the statute permits class 
actions and both pattern or practice and disparate impact lawsuits 
demonstrates the legitimacy of recognizing that disabilities can and do 
affect intersectional cohorts.  Additionally, the statutory contradiction 
should be resolved in favor of allowing individual plaintiffs to prove 
disability by showing their social cohort is dis/abled. 
 
 198. See supra notes 19, 118–25 and accompanying text (explaining the law). 
 199. See supra notes 19, 193 (explaining this requirement). 
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Showing that an intersectional cohort is dis/abled by social barriers 
should establish individual disability under the law when two 
important factors are present.  First, there should be empirical proof, 
likely in the form of statistics, that a cohort is being disabled by social 
norms in a particular environment.  In the Compton case, to be a 
Black and/or Latinx kid of any gender living in a poor, high-crime 
neighborhood does seem connected to the complex trauma that 
environment often spawns.  The very detailed Compton First 
Amended Complaint and the expert affidavits supporting the 
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and class certification 
would satisfy that requirement.  Second, that cohort should be 
narrowly enough defined in terms of being discrete and cohesive that 
we are confident that membership in the cohort makes it likely the 
individual also suffers the disability.  The Compton intersectional 
cohort is sufficiently discrete because it is not fungible with arguably 
similarly challenged groups, such as poor White rural students.  
Moreover, it is sufficiently cohesive because it shares identity 
characteristics, attributed identities, and common responses to 
societal treatment.  Since intersectional cohorts are dis/abled by 
societal barriers — for example, socially created trauma from racism 
and poverty that creates the very impairments that affect the major 
life activities of reading, remembering, and learning — this Article’s 
proposal to treat intersectional cohorts as a class comports with the 
underlying reality of the social construction of dis/ability. 
Calling for recognizing cohorts in disability law will generate 
criticism, but we think it is necessary to effectuate the law’s overall 
goal of removing social barriers.  Certainly, there is a tension between 
the idea of recognizing that social barriers dis/able people as a cohort 
and recognizing the dignity interests in treating people as individuals.  
But the overall purpose of the federal disability statutes is to address 
barriers established by social policies.  Those barriers could be 
physical, as in the lack of a ramp; temporal, as in the use of fixed-time 
tests; policy-based, as in the use of curricular measures that do not 
further the learning process; or even attitudinal, as in a decision to 
segregate certain children with dis/abilities from others in school 
classes and programs because of fear or distaste. 
Where structures of inner-city poverty and violence combine with 
racial discrimination, disability law ought to remedy those barriers, 
when they culminate in dis/abilities, as well.  We thus argue the 
federal disability statutes must be interpreted to recognize that 
complex trauma affects cohorts as well as individuals.  Accordingly, 
the Compton students’ and other similar class actions should be 
certified because the putative class’s status — poor, Black and Latinx 
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inner-city youth in schools where the students suffer a large 
percentage of ACEs  and the resultant complex trauma — establishes 
a high likelihood they suffer similar disabilities from the complex 
trauma that is alleged in the complaint. 
Some might object that disability law requires individual analysis, 
but the Compton court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the 
substantive claim of group-based harm already implies the 
appropriateness of certifying a class based on that group status.  In 
situations where the dis/ability is broadly shared and arises from 
group harm, however, the individualistic approach fails to adequately 
address the harms, their structural causes, and the proper remedies.  
It is true that the individual approach can be important to protect the 
rights of children with individual dis/abilities in schools.  While we 
emphasize the implications of the social construction approach, we 
recognize that allowing individuals to avoid social barriers based on 
stereotypes about groups was and continues to be important.  
Sometimes, distinguishing individuals from their intersectional 
cohorts will allow the fashioning of a better remedy.  However, at 
least where the remedy would be group-based, and would not harm 
non-group members, there is no reason to make every putative class 
member prove the disability individually.  That is, to certify a class 
under these circumstances, one should only need to show that a 
substantial portion of the group has a common experience and a 
common response.  Here, the remedies sought are school-wide 
changes in the delivery of curriculum and discipline, as well as testing 
to identify further dis/ability-based needs for individual students. 
Our contribution to dis/ability studies and critical race theory 
scholarship is to point out that individuals’ experiences of trauma and 
dis/ability are intertwined with their meso-level group-based identities 
and that the courts should remedy this problem.  When an 
intersectional cohort establishes that it suffers group-targeted harms 
that lead to dis/abilities, that should be deemed to establish the 
likelihood that individuals from the particular intersectional cohort 
suffer that dis/ability.  To say the individual is part of the 
intersectional cohort suffering group-based harm is to say that the 
individual is a member of a class that should be certified. 
If the Compton court had seriously considered the way the 
plaintiffs’ shared experiences of trauma make them an intersectional 
cohort, it might have understood that the individuals in the cohort 
already were likely to experience complex trauma and resulting 
disabilities.  We thus draw a conclusion about the Compton case — 
that establishing the likelihood that a social group will suffer a 
“disability” from a particular intersection of identities and 
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experiences should establish the likelihood that members of that 
intersectional cohort are disabled, so long as the science supports the 
conclusion.  We also draw a conclusion about intersectionality theory: 
that understanding intersectional cohorts helps us better analyze the 
shared nature of the trauma experienced by poor Black and/or Latinx 
inner-city students. 
CONCLUSION 
In Moonlight, Chiron achieves a kind of redemption, but at a heavy 
cost and with no thanks to his schooling.200  While preventing 
complex trauma and its concomitant injuries should definitely be the 
goal of innovative approaches like the New Deal for Children of 
Color recommended by Professor Dowd’s book, we argue that the 
complete social transformation recommended by Dowd is unlikely to 
occur in the near future.201  We go against the scholarly grain and see 
concrete ways that current disability law could be interpreted to aid 
the intersectional cohort of poor Black and Latinx students in 
violence-torn inner-city communities.  Consequently, we offer a 
strong social constructionist theory of dis/ability and the concept of 
intersectional cohorts as a means to modify procedures and practices 
in schools where these cohorts exist.  Existing disability law should 
allow class actions in cases like Compton and permit courts to enter 
mandatory injunctions requiring schools to modify their procedures 
to help ameliorate the harm suffered by students.  This Article shows 
why what ought to be is not as untenable as the Compton court 
suggests. 
Yet this Article’s larger contribution is to intervene in the 
literature of intersectionality theory by creating the concept of 
intersectional cohorts.  Whereas intersectionality theory has been 
about exploring the uniqueness of experiences of particular 
overlapping identities in distinct social contexts, our theory helps 
identify the relevant level of specificity for that analysis. Scholars 
should look at the processes of identity formation and the cultural 
context and identify relevant intersectional cohorts.  Whether 
considering dis/abilities, race, gender, class, and so on, evaluating who 
might be part of a discrete and cohesive intersectional cohort in a 
given social location can help us make new forms of argument.  As 
 
 200. Spoiler alert: the story does end with the potential for progress as Chiron is 
able to express his emotions to a former high school classmate. 
 201. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (arguing that Dowd’s plan is 
unlikely). 
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Nancy Dowd’s call for a new deal for children of color reminds us, 
kids like Chiron need and deserve this extension of intersectional 
analysis. 
